University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

1-1-2014

Electoral Systems and Ethnic Conciliation: A Structured, Focused
Analysis of Vote-Pooling in Northern Ireland Elections 1998–2011
Callum J. Forster
University of Denver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Forster, Callum J., "Electoral Systems and Ethnic Conciliation: A Structured, Focused Analysis of VotePooling in Northern Ireland Elections 1998–2011" (2014). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 972.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/972

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Electoral Systems and Ethnic Conciliation:
A Structured, Focused Analysis of Vote-Pooling in Northern Ireland Elections 1998-2011

__________
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver
__________
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

__________

by
Callum J. Forster
June 2014
Advisor: Timothy Sisk

©Copyright by Callum J. Forster 2014
All Rights Reserved

Author: Callum J. Forster
Title: Electoral Systems and Ethnic Conciliation: A Structured, Focused Analysis of
Vote-Pooling in Northern Ireland Elections 1998-2011
Advisor: Timothy Sisk
Degree Date: June 2014
Abstract
This research project examines the role of electoral system rules in affecting the extent of
conciliatory behavior and cross-ethnic coalition making in Northern Ireland. It focuses on
the role of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system in shaping party and
voter incentives in a post-conflict divided society. The research uses a structured, focused
comparison of the four electoral cycles since the Belfast Agreement of 1998. This enables
a systematic examination of each electoral cycle using a common set of criteria focused
on conciliation and cross-ethnic coalition making. Whilst preference voting is assumed to
benefit moderate candidates, in Northern Ireland centrist and multi-ethnic parties outside
of the dominant ethnic communities have received little electoral success. In Northern
Ireland the primary effect of STV has not been to encourage inter-communal voting but
to facilitate intra-community and intra-party moderation. STV has encouraged the
moderation of the historically extreme political parties in each of the ethnic bloc. Patterns
across electoral cycles suggest that party elites from the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) and Sinn Fein have moderated their policy positions due to the electoral system
rules. Therefore they have pursued lower-preference votes from within their ethnic bloc
but in doing so have marginalized parties of a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic orientation.
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Introduction
A decision on December 3 2012 by Belfast City Council to limit the number of
days in which the Union flag would be flown by the council1 resulted in widespread
disorder through December and into January, as loyalist and unionist protestors clashed
with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the offices of the multi-ethnic
Alliance Party were attacked (BBC, 2012). Days later, then United States Secretary of
State Hilary Clinton visited Belfast and declared the violence “a sad reminder,
unfortunately, that – despite how hardy the peace has been – there are still those who not
only would test it, but try to destroy it” (Morris, 2013).
Northern Ireland is the epitome of a post-conflict society that can be characterized
as being in a state of “no war, no peace” more than fifteen years after the formal end of
conflict (Mac Ginty, 2006). The legacies of conflict continue to be ever-present in
Northern Irish society. The education system operates on a highly sectarian basis through
mono-ethnic schools, communities continue to reject plans to tear down ‘peace walls’
separating rival communities, and security threats persist despite the lack of societal
violence.
In the education sector, 93 per cent of children attend segregated schools, with
most schools funded by the state being either Protestant or Catholic (O’Sullivan, 2013).
1

Prior to this vote the flag had been flown every day since 1906.
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In 2010, DUP leader and First Minister Peter Robinson declared the education system as
a ‘benign form of apartheid which is fundamentally damaging to our society’ (Belfast
Telegraph, 2010). In June 2013, President Obama stated in a Town Hall meeting in
Northern Ireland that:
Because issues like segregated schools and housing, lack of jobs and
opportunity — symbols of history that are a source of pride for some and pain for
others — these are not tangential to peace; they're essential to it. If towns remain
divided — if Catholics have their schools and buildings, and Protestants have
theirs — if we can't see ourselves in one another, if fear or resentment are allowed
to harden, that encourages division. It discourages cooperation (White House,
2013).
The most recent annual Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey found that 68 per
cent of respondents would prefer to send their child to a mixed-religion school (Life and
Times Survey, 2012). Despite this, there has been little advancement in efforts to develop
multi-ethnic schools. Recent practice has focused on seeking to develop ‘shared
education’ whereby students from different schools have one lesson or extracurricular
activities together. This effort however has only reached 10,000 out of Northern Ireland’s
330,000 school-age students (NISRA, 2013). Despite the support for multi-ethnic schools
in opinion polls there is little progress towards the advancement of integrated schools,
even though it is estimated that the separate education system inflates the cost of
Northern Ireland’s education by 1 billion GBP a year (1.68 billion USD) and results in a
surplus of 85,000 school places each year (TES, 2013).
In Northern Ireland, ‘peace’ walls that communities erected during ‘the Troubles’
continue to separate ethnic communities, particularly in Belfast and Londonderry. Such
2

walls are intended to keep ‘peace’ between antagonistic communities, but continue to
provoke stone throwing by youths either side of the wall. In Belfast alone, there are
currently 99 different walls and barriers separating unionist and nationalist communities,
with some of these barriers being more than 10 metres high (O’Hagan, 2012). Many of
those living by the walls continue to support their retention, and more walls have been
built since the signing of the Agreement than were during the Troubles (McDonald,
2013). The Northern Irish government recently announced a goal to remove the walls by
2023, something that many commentators saw as too optimistic (Belfast Telegraph,
2013).
Public housing, traditionally a source of tension due to its discriminatory
provision, remains segregated. 90 per cent of public housing is currently segregated,
whilst the most polarized housing estates have more than 80 per cent of one community
living there (Madden, 2011). Despite these figures, 80 per cent of people say that they
would prefer to live in a mixed housing area, yet progress remains slow. The Northern
Irish Housing Executive recently announced a plan for 30 new mixed housing areas
(Madden, 2011) but efforts to integrate pre-existing housing communities remains absent.
In June 2013, rioting and disorder reemerged in response to a decision by the
PSNI, in accordance with the Parades Commission, the body that regulates marches and
parades in Northern Ireland, to block an Orange Order Parade from passing through the
nationalist Ardoyne area (BBC, 2013). Rioting and disorder involving the burning of
property, cars and attacks on police that lasted for a week and resulted in 1,300 additional
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police officers being deployed in Belfast from England, Scotland and Wales under the
emergency “mutual aid” agreement (BBC, 2013a).
As a result of the violence, the First and Deputy First Ministers of Northern
Ireland invited United States diplomat Richard Hass, who served as President George W.
Bush’s envoy to Northern Ireland, to chair talks between unionist and nationalist leaders
(CFR, 2013). The talks sought to tackle some of the most divisive and pressing issues
facing society, including parades, symbols and ‘matters stemming from the past’ (CFR,
2013). After six months of talks discussions collapsed at 4am on Christmas Eve. A
resumed set of talks collapsed on New Year’s Eve 2013, despite an intervention by U.S.
Vice President Joe Biden in the final days of the talks (Clarke, 2014).
Fall 2013 saw continued media interest on issues relating to those who had
“disappeared” during the course of the Troubles.2 Attention focused on the killing of Jean
McConville by the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in 1973. McConville was a mother of ten
suspected by the PIRA of providing information about republican activities to the British
Security Services (McDonald, 2013). Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams faced media and
civil society pressure over accusations that he personally authorized her abduction and
killing (McDonald, 2013). Amidst this, the suggestion of the Northern Irish Attorney
General that there should be an end to prosecutions for Troubles-related killings
provoked outrage in both the unionist and nationalist communities (Independent, 2013).

2

The BBC, for instance, produced a 90 minute documentary ‘The Disappeared’ that focused on the continuing trauma of the relatives
of those taken, killed and buried. It also investigated the alleged involvement of Republican leader Gerry Adams in one of the killings.
(BBC, 2013b).
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DUP Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), Jeffrey Donaldson declared in
response “you cannot say that murder is not a crime – it is” (BBC, 2013).
Security threats remain ubiquitous within Northern Ireland. Recent figures
released by the PSNI showed that on average bomb disposal officers were called out
more than once a day to disable explosive devices within Northern Ireland (Kilpatrick,
2013) At the end of November 2013 for instance, a 60 kg bomb partially exploded near
Belfast’s Victoria Square shopping center (Sky, 2013). Two weeks later on December 13,
a bomb exploded in Belfast’s Cathedral Quarter as the police were clearing the area
(Kilpatrick, 2013).
Today, inter-communal relations remain tense. Issues involving rituals and
symbols remain particularly contentious. Tensions over flags and parades remain
unresolved, and the two communities largely operate separately of each other. In the face
of these societal issues presented above, this thesis will examine the sphere of Northern
Ireland’s politics, in particular its electoral processes since the signing of the 1998
Agreement.
In recent years, considerable attention has turned to the role of electoral systems
in shaping the ‘rules of the game’ in post-conflict societies, particularly given that
different electoral systems can change the incentives for voters and political elites within
a society. Given that politicians can be seen as actors who seek to maximize their vote
and as such are likely to respond to the incentives of the electoral society in which they
operate, then this paper analyzes the role of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral
5

system in Northern Ireland. In doing so it will examine the extent to which it has
provided incentives for conciliation, and encouraged multi-ethnic and non-ethnic parties
within Northern Irish politics since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998.

As this paper will show, the incentives of electoral systems can be significant and
can encourage groups to engage in ‘bridging’ or ‘bonding’ strategies, the former
encouraging politicians to build a broad coalition of support whilst the latter encourage
politicians to focus on gaining support from a narrow basis of the electorate. Such
incentives are indicative of larger power-sharing debates in the post-conflict literature.
The first dominant approach, consociationalism, seeks to elevate ethnic groups into a
grand governing coalition through the explicit recognition and representation of
ethnically based political parties (Lijphart, 1991). The other approach, centripetalism,
seeks to encourage inter-ethnic cooperation through the development of parties with
cross-cutting social cleavages, that are often dependent on votes from a number of
different sections of society (Reilly, 2001; Sisk, 1995). This seeks to focus political
competition by actors within the moderate middle of politics.
Northern Ireland’s political development since 1998 represents a puzzling case.
Key debates in the literature have focused on consociationalism and centripetalism,
outlined above. Northern Ireland has a consociational system of governance, yet an
electoral system expected to provide centripetal incentives. Despite this paradox, the
expected centripetal dynamics of the electoral system have failed to support the
development of multi-ethnic centrist parties in Northern Ireland and instead Northern
6

Ireland’s ‘extreme’ parties have come to dominate political life, despite what supporters
of centripetalism and advocates of proportional representative electoral systems might
expect.
The choice of electoral system is a key contributor to aiding inclusion, and it has
been noted that ‘the foundations of democratic stability rest on inclusion’ (Reynolds,
2011: 31). It has been argued that several elections under the same rules need to take
place before their systematic effects stabilize and both parties and voters learn to use
them to their best advantage (Taagepera, 2004). With the completion of four election
cycles in Northern Ireland since the Belfast Agreement, an analysis of Northern Ireland’s
election cycles is timely.
The electoral incentives of STV provides the possibility to ensure that ethnic
voting cannot dominate politics and that voting does not simply become an ‘ethnic
census’, as has been the case in recent elections in Iraq and Lebanon, where subsequent
polls within each country returned near identical results. In contrast, STV provides
political elites electoral incentives to appeal outside of their narrowly defined ethnic
constituencies and engage in ‘vote-pooling strategies’ (Reynolds, 2011: 21).3 The
proportionality of the STV system also aids stability and political competition. However,
despite the incentives that STV provides there exists a paradox. Since 2003, Northern
Ireland’s historically extreme parties, the DUP and Sinn Fein have flourished, whilst the
traditionally more moderate parties, the SDLP, the UUP and multi-ethnic and centrist

3

Vote pooling is explained by Donald Horowitz as when ‘electorally, the way to induce politicians to be moderate is to structure
voting arrangements so politicians must rely, in part, on votes delivered by members of a group other than their own. Such incentives
are effective because those votes will not be forthcoming unless the candidates receiving them can be portrayed as being moderate on
inter-ethnic issues’ (Horowitz, 1997: 24).

7

parties have declined, despite the incentives STV provides to voters to vote beyond their
own ethnic community. This paper therefore examines the puzzle as to why the
traditionally extreme parties have performed more successfully than moderate parties,
despite the electoral incentives STV provides to the voter.
The importance of research on institutions is highlighted by the call for ‘new
institutionalism’ within the field of comparative politics given the importance of the
organization of political life (March and Olsen, 1984). In societies emerging from intercommunal conflict, such as Northern Ireland, the electoral system is one of the most
important and fundamental institutions within society, and has a deep impact on future
political life (International IDEA, 2005). Discussion of electoral systems often seems
“mechanistic, abstract and highly technical” (Norris, 2004: 64).
The reality however is that the choice of electoral system has a profound and
visible impact. This is particularly true given that electoral systems tend to remain
untouched once adopted and actors come to respond to the incentives they provide
(International IDEA, 2005). The behavior of political elites, the policies they advocate,
and the extent to which voters accept or reject them, have a significant role in either
contributing to or impinging upon efforts to improve social cohesion within society. The
electoral system is therefore ‘perhaps the most powerful instrument available for
institutional engineering with far-reaching consequences for party systems, the
composition of legislatures, and the durability of democratic arrangements’ (Lijphart and
Waisman, 1996, quoted in Reynolds 2002: 207). Given this, this research will examine
the extent of conciliatory campaigning behavior and the extent to which campaigning is
8

marked by efforts by politicians to attract votes outside their traditional core base through
a repositioning on the political spectrum and the moderation of policy, in comparison to
rival parties.
Despite the recent focus on the role of electoral systems and elections in a postconflict environment, others are more skeptical of this approach. Perhaps the most
common approach to conflict management is to regulate the operation of political parties
in divided societies (Reilly, 2006). In some cases this includes the banning of ethnic
parties in order to block small or regionally based parties from getting electoral
representation. In Nigeria, parties have to display a ‘federal character’ through two-thirds
of states being represented on party executives and by law parties are not permitted to
have a name, symbol or motto with ethnic connotations (Reilly, 2006: 816). In Southeast
Asia it is common to place cross-regional thresholds on party formation. In the
Philippines parties cannot compete unless they have regional offices in at least 9 of the 16
regions of the country (Reilly, 2006: 817). Beyond those who focus on institutional forms
of conflict management, others examine other modes of encouraging conciliation. This
includes approaches focused on political elites, culture and political economy, amongst
others. Analyzes of ‘bottom-up’ grassroots peacebuilding initiatives and their potential
impact on ‘everyday life’, such as Paula Pickering’s Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The
View from the Ground Floor, have also emerged in response to the focus of much of the
political science literature on political elites.
Northern Ireland serves as the seminal test case for examining the impact of STV
in a post-conflict society given that Northern Ireland is the only such society where STV
9

is used.4 To rigorously examine the impact of STV in Northern Ireland, this project
employs a structured, focused comparison of each of the election cycles for Northern
Ireland’s Assembly since 1998. Within the single country case, a comparison of the four
different event cycles will be used. It will seek to understand under what conditions
electoral system rules affect the extent of conciliatory campaigning behavior and crossethnic coalition making in Northern Ireland elections in the four electoral cycles since the
Belfast Agreement of 1998.
Northern Ireland represents a theory testing case (Bennett and George, 2005: 74)
that seeks to assess the validity of competing theories related to the operation of STV.
Benjamin Reilly argues that electoral incentives under preferential electoral systems will
lead to the development of a political system of “centrist, aggregative and multi-ethnic
political parties” (Reilly, 2006: 816). In contrast, Donald Horowitz critiques STV for
having the potential for reducing the prospect for inter-ethnic cooperation given the low
threshold needed to win a seat in six-member constituencies. This paper seeks to examine
the extent to which an analysis of the four election cycles since Northern Ireland’s 1998
peace agreement confirm or disconfirm Reilly’s theory. This study operates under the
assumption of rational-choice institutionalism, that is that the rules adopted in a political
system have the capacity to shape the electoral incentives facing politicians (Norris,
2004: 8). It also assumes that those same political operators are vote-maximizers who
participate in elections in order to win political office.

4

STV is used for national level elections in the Republic of Ireland, Australia and Malta, which are all notable for their ethnic/identity
homogeneity.
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With increasing awareness about the role of the electoral system in aiding
proportionality, ensuring representation of minorities and using incentives to help
‘engineer’ cooperation and accommodation within deeply divided societies, this
examination of STV will provide important scrutiny of one of the electoral systems
available to societies seeking to move beyond division and the reminders of war. This
thesis finds that the evidence suggests that party elites from the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the historically extremist parties, have moderated their policy
positions due to the incentives of electoral rules. Therefore the DUP and Sinn Fein have
pursued lower-preference votes from within their ethnic bloc in pursuit of electoral
success. In doing so parties that have a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic orientation have been
marginalized electorally. Therefore the case of Northern Ireland is a theory disconfirming
case given that electoral incentives have failed to lead to electoral success for the
development of a political system of centrist, aggregative and multi-ethnic political
parties. Where vote pooling has occurred, it has predominantly been within an ethnic
community, rather than across ethnic lines.
The nature of the operation of STV in a post-conflict society, and the completion
of four election cycles in Northern Ireland since the termination of conflict warrants close
examination. This is particularly true given that Stefan Lindberg has noted that a
learning process occurs both for political elites and voters through repeated democratic
behavior (Lindberg, 2006). The next section provides an overview of the salient electoral
literature related to election rules in deeply divided societies. The third section examines
the history of conflict in Northern Ireland and its electoral system history. The fourth
11

section analyzes each of the election cycles in Northern Ireland since 1998. The final
section makes a number of principal findings.
The data used in this study has been accumulated from numerous sources
including the Electoral Office of Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Assembly
Research and Information Service and the Northern Ireland ARK, a joint resource of
Queen’s University Belfast and the University of Ulster focused on political and social
life in Northern Ireland.

Structured Focused Questions
This paper identifies a number of theoretically motivated critical variables to be
analyzed across the four election case studies. It will ask the following questions of each
election case study.
1) What was the preceding context to the election?
2) What were the results of the election?
3) Providing Incentives for Conciliation
To what extent has STV provided incentives for conciliation within Northern Ireland?
a) To what extent has STV encouraged political parties to make more
inclusionary political appeals?
b) To what extent has STV encouraged voters to vote for parties that have
traditionally represented a different societal group? Under what
circumstances do voters use their lower preference votes?

12

c) To what extent has STV facilitated cross-community vote transfers and
what significance have such votes had?
4) Encouraging Multi-ethnic and Non-ethnic Political Parties
To what extent has STV encouraged broad based, cross-cutting political parties within
society/affected party formation?
a) Non-ethnic and multi-ethnic parties
b) Independent candidates

13

Electoral Systems And Deeply Divided Societies
Power Sharing After Conflict and the Role of Post-Conflict Elections For Peace
Consolidation
Electoral systems play a fundamental role in the political development of any
society. As a core component of the constitutional framework, electoral systems have
proved to be particularly intractable and sticky. As such, electoral systems tend to lead to
institutional inertia and institutional path dependency (North, 1981), with such
institutions becoming embedded within society, and often not being subject to reform
given the difficulty in reaching the consensus needed to fundamentally reshape the
incentives of political life.
In post-conflict societies, electoral systems develop even greater importance given
that a particular electoral system can promote and incentivize certain behaviors. Some
systems provide greater incentives for the development of cross-cutting cleavages,
thereby encouraging conciliation and enhancing social cohesion. Other systems may
encourage political elites to gain power through ethnic outbidding, risking an escalation
into insecurity and heightened tension. Thus, “institutional engineering” can potentially
contribute to shaping the dynamics of political life in a post-conflict society (Reilly,
2001).

14

In other circumstances, societies simply continue with their pre-existing electoral
system with little or no thought given to the issue of how it might affect future politics or
modes of inclusion and exclusion within a society. Yet, either way, the electoral system
can be critical in supporting or undermining the ‘strategic imagination’ of groups as they
envision how the political system will operate once conflict is over. Not only this, but the
electoral system can be of fundamental importance given the extent to which it creates an
inclusive system of government, such as the degree to which it may or may not facilitate
the inclusion of extremists, and the impact that this can have on spoiler violence.
Consequently, there exists considerable debate about which electoral systems represent
the best opportunity for a particular society to consolidate peace, and in some cases,
democracy at the same time (Jarstad, 2008).
Amidst the debate to select a particular electoral system as best for post-conflict
societies, critical to choosing the right system is to have a clear sense of the needs and
priorities of that particular society. Thus, societies face a number of dilemmas as they
emerge from civil war (Sisk, 2008). Competing goals are numerous. Are effective
government and the implementation of policy the aim, or is inclusion through
proportional representation important, particularly as it enables voters to see the value of
each of their votes? In some societies, fears of electoral violence in the aftermath of the
election might necessitate a system that enables electoral results to be published quickly
and in a transparent manner. In societies with more complex electoral systems, counting
may require a much more extensive procedure. Thus issues of proportionality,
accountability, representation, stable party systems and stable governing coalitions are
15

important in shaping electoral system choice (International IDEA, 2005). The full choice
of electoral systems is illustrated by Figure 1, below. The development of electoral
system reform, particularly through increased adoption of PR, is highlighted by a
comparison of Figure 1, (1997) and current electoral system use in Figure 2.

Nation States
191

Majoritarian
93

Majority
27
AV
2

2nd Ballot
25

FPTP
54

Combined
27

Plurality
66

Independent
14

Bloc Vote
10

STNV
2

Dependent
13

PR
64

STV
2

No direct elections
7

Party List
62
Closed

Open

Figure 1: World Electoral System use for lower house of parliament (1997)
(Source: Norris, 2004: 113)
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Figure 2: World Electoral System use for National Legislatures (2014)
(Source: International IDEA, 2014)
Electoral System Choice as a Path-Dependent Outcome of Peace Negotiations
Despite the wide debate about the best electoral choice to use in post-conflict
societies, recent evidence shows that Proportional Representation (PR) is now the
‘standard choice’ in post-conflict societies, particularly in elections held under UN
supervision (Bogaards, 2013: 71). This is because PR is generally seen to work as
intended and helps to secure peace through an inclusive legislature, reducing the risk of
an inflammation of violence like those associated with a ‘winner takes all’ electoral
contest. However, it is important to note other factors are also important in its choice. PR
is also usually preferred is because it enables the rapid holding of elections in the wake of
a peace agreement due to the ease of vote counting and voter registration procedures
(Reilly, 2008).
Bogaards’ findings support Borman and Golder’s landmark 2013 study that
surveyed the use of electoral systems in democracies around the world between 1946 and
17

2011 (Borman and Golder, 2013). The authors found that PR and mixed systems are
increasingly being adopted whilst the number of elections held with majoritarian systems
has fallen significantly. Given the role of exclusion as a contributing dynamic in
escalation to conflict, the desire to ensure inclusion through the electoral system is
unsurprising. However, there exists little empirical evidence that PR has a positive impact
on democracy and development.
Despite more than 30 comprehensive peace agreements being signed in recent
years, only 12 peace agreements reference the electoral system (Bogaards, 2013: 79).
When the peace agreement does specify the electoral system to be used, it is always a
PR-based system (Bogaards, 2013: 82). The use of PR systems though does clearly
deliver an inclusive parliament. Such work builds on Lijphart’s attempts since 1991 to
advocate for the adoption of PR systems, arguing that they were superior in “democratic
performance” than majoritarian systems based on eight variables, including the inclusion
of minorities.
Despite the widespread use of PR systems in post-conflict states, many authors
critique this trend. Bogaards notes that “despite the obvious popularity of PR, it has been
hard to prove – even for its most ardent advocates – that PR has a positive impact on
peace and democracy, especially in the context of post-conflict societies” (Bogaards,
2013: 75).
In contrast, Donald Horowitz is a fierce supporter of the use of the Alternative
Vote (AV) electoral system. He argues that despite it being a majoritarian system, it is
18

significantly different to a Single Member Plurality system (Horowitz, 1991). In Fiji, AV
was introduced to ameliorate ethnic divisions within the country. The intention was that
AV, used in heterogeneous constituencies, would encourage vote pooling and the
emergence of more moderate parties, particularly given the high electoral threshold of 50
per cent of the vote plus one vote (Horowitz, 1991).
The advantage of such a system is that a preferential ballot may also “flush out”
second or third choices that traverse the ethnic divide (Horowitz, 1991: 178). The basis
for this therefore is for each political party to be incentivized to encourage inclusion,
therefore inducing centripetal appeals. This is rather different to Lijphart, who sees the
raison d’être of the electoral system as ensuring straight forward proportionality and
fairness between groups, enabling political stability through power-sharing (Mitchell,
2013:4-5). It also has the benefit of encouraging political elites to make electoral pacts,
enabling the exchange of lower vote preferences between supporters. Therefore, in
preferential systems the incentivization benefits that are provided can affect both the
behavior of voters and the behavior of political elites. Overall the basis of AV for
Horowitz is:
The approach I have advocated is to adopt an electoral system that will make
moderation rewarding by making politicians reciprocally dependent on the votes
of members of groups other than their own. The dependence is only marginal, of
course, but it will sometimes be the margin of victory. Since the parties must pool
votes rather than merely pool seats, they must find ways before the election to
communicate their ethnically and racially conciliatory intentions to the voters.
After the election they must deliver on those commitments or risk electoral
retribution (Horowitz, 1991:196).
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Critics of proportional systems highlight that such systems risk the
institutionalization of societal cleavages (Cohen, 1997: 613). Further, given the ease of
representation they can encourage polarization and fragmentation (Lardeyret, 2006). In
particular these systems usually allow small, regional and more specialized parties to
achieve electoral success. Proponents however argue that this is the very benefit of such
systems given that this aids ethnic and identity conflict management by including groups
from across the political spectrum. Under proportional systems, those previously
excluded have a realistic expectation of achieving representation within political
institutions (Cohen, 1997: 627). To some extent, this therefore represents an
‘institutionalism of conflict’ as part of a conflict management approach (Cohen, 1997:
614), at least in the short term. As such, a fine balance exists in societies that use
proportional systems to ensure that they do not exacerbate ethnic tensions within society.
As Reilly has noted, due to this concern the electoral system is often supplemented by
additional electoral rules, such as minimum thresholds (Reilly, 2013: 94).
Andrew Reynolds, reflecting these wider debates, advocates PR systems on the
basis of four reasons. First, he argues that they are the ‘fairest’ method of electing
representatives, particularly compared to those with single-member constituencies.
Second, they are most likely to be inclusive. Third, as Lijphart argues, PR is more likely
to encourage power-sharing governments and fourth, because of the first three reasons,
PR is likely to enhance prospects for democracy in the country in question (Reynolds,
2006: 121-134).
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Finally, authors such as Joel Barkan are concerned about the absence of a clear
link between a single representative and each voter, particularly given its absence in party
list regional systems of PR operating in predominantly agricultural societies (Barkan,
2006: 136). Barkan instead prefers majoritarian systems, such as First Past The Post
(FPTP), which have a clear geographical link between voter and representative. Such a
clear link ensures enhanced modes of accountability and representation.
Electoral systems in general are ‘sticky’ and once adopted are difficult to reform.
The self-interest of political parties is at the heart of this difficulty. Moving from a
majoritarian to a proportional system requires the dominant (usually two) parties to
resolve to give up their power. The 2011 referendum in the United Kingdom on the issue
of whether the Alternative Vote system should be adopted for Westminster elections
highlighted this. The two largest parties did not support the change. The Conservative
Party campaigned against the change and the Labour Party took no official position due
to divisions within the party on the issue. Smaller parties, such as the Liberal Democrats,
the anti-European Union United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Green
Party, all campaigned in favor. In contrast, any attempt to move from a proportional
system to a majoritarian system requires smaller parties to accept a reduced possibility of
electoral success in future elections, or as Lardeyet put it, ‘doing so requires independent
parties to cooperate in their own liquidation’ (Lardeyet, 1991: 34).
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Debates within the electoral system literature on choice and incentives
Many scholars argue that democracy and peace “in ethnically-diverse societies are
likely to be fostered by the development of broad-based, aggregative, and multi-ethnic
political parties, rather than fragmented, personalized, or ethnically based party systems”
(Reilly, 2006: 816). Others disagree, and much debate exists as to how such party
systems can be sustained. Arend Lijphart, for example, proposes a party-list form of
proportional representation within a consociational system of politics (Lijphart, 2008).
Benjamin Reilly and Timothy Sisk place greater emphasis on the power of
centripetalism in promoting and sustaining such multi-ethnic political parties.5 Reilly
argues that a system where:
The provision of electoral incentives for campaigning politicians to reach out to
and attract votes from ethnic groups other than their own, thus encouraging
candidates to moderate their political rhetoric on potentially divisive issues and
forcing them to broaden their policy positions (Reilly, 2006: 816).
Reilly argues that these electoral incentives will lead to the development of a
political system of “centrist, aggregative and multi-ethnic political parties” (Reilly, 2006:
816). This is particularly important because such inclusive political parties play an
important role not just in advocating the interests of their supporters but also in achieving
peaceful conflict resolution and managing the conflict through peaceful means itself.
Vote pooling incentives, such as through electoral systems can encourage cross-party

5

Centripetalism is a system where ‘the explicit aim is to engineer a centripetal spin to the political system – to pull the parties towards
moderate, compromising policies, and to discover and reinforce the center of a deeply divided political spectrum’ (Sisk, 1995:19).
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inter-ethnic cooperation, in contrast to the ethnic outbidding that can prevail in societies
using FPTP, or a ‘winner takes all’ electoral system.6
In contrast to centripetalism, some scholars see consociationalism as the most
effective means of managing conflict within politics. There are four components of
Lijphart’s consociationalism (Lijphart, 1969). This includes a grand coalition of all the
major political parties through power-sharing within the Executive, proportional
inclusion of political parties, provisions for cultural autonomy and self-government, and
group vetoes within the Assembly in order to ensure that key decisions are made with
sufficient cross-community consent.
Pippa Norris frames the debate in this area into two schools, focusing on rationalchoice institutionalism and cultural modernization. Rational-choice institutionalism
argues that by creating new electoral rules with new incentives this provides reformers
with the capacity to alter the behavior of parties, politicians and citizens, potentially
mitigating the risk of social conflict (Norris, 2004). In contrast, the cultural
modernization school adopts a much more cautious approach and instead argues that
formal rules merely adapt to deeply embedded patterns of human behavior, rather than
changing them (Norris, 2004: i).
Arend Lijphart advocates for the use of closed list party-list systems in postconflict societies (Lijphart, 2008). Lijphart sees the power this gives political elites as
essential within his larger consociational model of managing inter-communal conflict.
6

Electoral systems are not the only institutions capable of moving politics beyond a ‘winner takes all’ system. The legislature, the
judiciary, anti-corruption organizations, and formal electoral rules all have a role in limiting such politics.
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Thus, in consociational systems of a grand coalition of ethnic parties from across the
spectrum, he argues that the party-list electoral system is key to making party leaders
more powerful within their party. This is because they are better able to sustain interethnic consociational deals.
A key debate at the center of electoral system choice focuses on inclusion, and the
extent to which it may impinge on effective governance. Majoritarian systems tend to
create a “manufactured” majority, which is a one-party government with an effective
working parliamentary majority, whilst minor parties, particularly those with
geographically dispersed support are penalized (Norris, 2004: 43). Thus the aim is to
enable the government to push through its policy agenda rather than ensuring the
representation of minority party views within the legislature. Majoritarian systems such
as these can then be divided into two further categories. These are electoral systems
where the winner must gain an absolute majority of votes in order to win and those where
a simple plurality of voters is sufficient to be declared the winner (Norris, 2004: 43).
Majoritarian systems tend to be conflict-inducing given that they increase the threshold of
votes each candidate needs to secure and at the same time decrease the opportunities for
political victory (Cohen, 1997: 612).
The most common plural system is FPTP, commonly used in the United Kingdom
and the United States. Under FPTP the country is divided into single-member
constituencies. Voters in each constituency cast a single vote for one candidate only.
Consequently, the candidate with the largest share of the vote in each constituency is
elected with the party with the largest number of parliamentary seats, then forming the
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government. The nature of the “winner’s bonus” means that the winning party gains an
exaggerated number of seats when compared to the percentage of the vote that they
received. This allows the governing party to have sufficient a majority to enable them to
govern effectively even in the context of a close election when looking at the percentage
of the vote received.
Under FPTP there is rarely an electoral threshold that needs to be passed, and
candidates do not need an absolute majority to be elected. Consequently, a candidate may
win with, for instance, only 30 per cent of the vote if there are a number of other
candidates running against the candidate. On the same basis, governments are often
formed without a plurality of votes. In the United Kingdom no governing party has won
as much as half the popular vote since 1935 (Norris, 2004: 44). The impact on minor
parties is substantial, given that those with a relatively large but dispersed support may
finish in second or third position in a large number of constituencies, but achieve little
parliamentary representation.
A less commonly used plurality electoral system is the Single Non-Transferable
Vote (SNTV). SNTV was used in Japan from 1948 to 1993 and adopted in Afghanistan
in the aftermath of the 2001 U.S.-led state-building project (International IDEA, 2013). It
is also used for parliamentary elections in Jordan and Vanuatu. Under this system,
multiple candidates, including from the same party, compete with each other for support
within a particular district (Norris, 2004: 48). Candidates run as individuals (although
they can list a party affiliation), and only require a simple plurality in order to win office.
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Each voter can vote for one candidate, despite the fact that constituencies often
elect multiple representatives. Those with the highest number of votes are elected.
Therefore, if a constituency was electing four candidates, one candidate could be elected
with 90 per cent of support, and the other three with 3 per cent support each (Reynolds,
2006: 105). The system encourages independents to run in a party-dominated system and
can boost turnout given voters are voting for a particular candidate, rather than a closed
party list.
The use of SNTV in Afghanistan since 2005 has been much criticized (Rubin,
2005). SNTV is associated with causing voter confusion, and a highly fragmented
parliament. Its use went against the trend since the 1990’s of using list-PR systems in
post-conflict states. Although SNTV has been used on a very limited basis in new
democracies, the experience of Jordan since 1993 provided a clear indication of what the
result of its implementation would be. The use of SNTV in Jordan was deliberately
intended to maintain fragmentation within the legislature, preventing the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood (Reynolds, 2006: 75).
In Afghanistan, the large number of candidates running meant that many
candidates were elected despite receiving only a small number of votes. This had the
unintended effect of encouraging vote buying given the benefits of gaining just a few
extra votes. A third of Afghanistan’s constituencies had more than 9 seats, with the
highest having 33. In the Kabul constituency, 400 candidates contested 33 seats, with the
last winning candidate winning with only 0.5 per cent of the vote in Kabul (Reynolds,
2006: 113).
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Once in office, there was little incentive for these representatives to cooperate
given that they had achieved election by running on an independent platform (Rubin,
2005). Thus, the electoral system impinged upon the development of a stable,
accountable party system and instead created a system of “independent MPs allied with
regional and national strongmen” with little coherent ideological platform (Reynolds,
2006, 111). Given this, the Karzai administration has been forced to cobble together ad
hoc coalitions for each piece of legislation it has sought to pass. The large number of
candidates also meant that there was a large number of “wasted votes” given to
candidates who did not win.
Within the majority branch of the electoral family, there exist two further systems.
Second ballot elections ensure that the winning candidate has gained an overall majority
of votes. This occurs through two means – an automatic victory for candidates winning
an absolute majority of 50 per cent or more in the first round, or through a second round
of elections held between the two candidates with the highest share of the vote in the first
round. However, these rules inhibit the success of minor parties and demands that
citizens attend the polls twice, which may affect turnout (Norris, 2004: 49). In societies
with few resources for elections, the cost involved may also be prohibitive.
The other system used is AV. In this system, voters rank their preferences among
candidates using the 1,2,3 scale. In order to win, a candidate needs to achieve an absolute
majority of votes. If no candidate has scored more than 50 per cent of the vote after the
first preferences are counted, then the candidate with the least votes is eliminated and
their votes are redistributed to the other candidates. This process continues until one
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candidate has an absolute majority. As a majoritarian system, this process provides a
winners bonus and can convert a closely fought election into giving the winner a
significant parliamentary bonus. Consequently, critics such as Arend Lijphart have
argued that AV is no more likely to reward moderation than FPTP.
Despite the variances of majoritarian systems, the concern remains that
majoritarian systems risk creating a system whereby ‘political minorities are persistent
electoral losers’, and therefore are excluded from representative institutions, thereby
reducing support for political institutions as a whole (Norris, 2004: 213).
In contrast to many majoritarian electoral systems, PR systems provide incentives
for consensus and the inclusion of all voices on the basis that this will lead to
compromise and bargaining within the legislature. This is achieved because these systems
reduce the threshold of votes needed in order to get an individual candidate elected.
The most commonly used form of PR system is the party list system. Norway,
Finland and the Netherlands use open list systems, whilst in closed list systems, as used
in Portugal, Spain and Germany voters only vote for a party to support and the
individuals elected are determined by their rank on each party’s list. In open list systems
the electorate can express a preference for particular candidates and a party preference
(Norris, 2004: 51). In some systems a threshold is set in order to ensure that parties have
sufficient support in order to be able to achieve representation. In the Netherlands this is
only 0.67 per cent of the national vote, the lowest, whilst in Turkey it is 10 per cent
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(Reilly, 2013: 94). Within PR, generally the larger the district size, the more proportional
the result thereby reducing the barriers for smaller parties (Norris, 2004: 55).
Within the electoral systems literature, there exists considerable debate about the
relative advantages of multi-member and single-member districts. This debate reflects
wider debates about proportionality and the nature of the relationship between the elected
representative and the voter. In deeply divided societies emerging from the context of
inter-communal conflict, single member districts are often not regarded as appropriate.
Large parties are more likely to benefit from such systems, yet this is particularly the case
given post-war conditions. Parties emerging during a democratic transition are often
poorly organized and under resourced, enabling success for larger parties, particularly
those representing incumbent elites who held office prior to the conflict (Birch, 2005:
286).
Given that systems with single-party districts generally create one-party
majorities, critical to ensuring that the government governs in a capacity conducive to
democracy is the ability to have a well-organized opposition, with sufficient strength to
stay ‘in the game’ (Birch, 2005: 286). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
adoption of electoral systems varied considerably, yet a trend was the move from single
district systems to multi-member districts. This could be explained by either representing
a reversion to a previous experience with multi-member districts or a desire to ensure that
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democratic practices remained assured as part of a wider move towards European Union
membership (Birch, 2005: 296).7
The Theory and Concept of STV
The other main type of PR system is the Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral
system. STV has been used in legislative elections in Northern Ireland since 1973, the
Republic of Ireland since 1992, Malta since 1921 and the Australian Senate since 1949,
reflecting the fact that STV was devised in Britain in the nineteenth century.8 Although a
detailed explanation of how STV operates is included in the next chapter, it is worth
noting that STV provides much greater freedom of choice than other electoral systems
because it allows the voter to vote for multiple candidates, including from different
parties, representing a deviation from the norm of PR.
Consequently, STV encourages parties to engage in bridging or ‘vote-pooling’
strategies, whereby their victory might be reliant on votes outside of their core support.
This is in contrast to PR systems, which can encourage bonding strategies, given the low
electoral thresholds. Therefore under PR, parties may seek to gain votes from a narrow,
segmented part of the electorate, typically from groups with clear exclusionary
boundaries (Norris, 2004: 10).

7

These include Armenia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and the Russian
Federation.
8

The other notable use of STV has been Estonia’s experimentation with it in first post-Soviet election in 1990. Given the stark divides
between majority Estonians and the Russian-speaking minority, in this founding election there was little centripetal behavior.
Consequently, STV was not used in subsequent elections due to the mistaken belief that it did not encourage centripetal behavior. It
was replaced with list PR which contains even fewer such incentives.

30

The incentive that ‘vote-pooling’ encourages is a major advantage for a deeply
divided society (Horowitz, 1985, 628). The proportionality that STV provides is
particularly important in enhancing the legitimacy of those elected, in contrast to the
illegitimacy often associated with those elected by anomalies in majoritarian systems.
Supporters also argue that STV enables parties with cross-cutting cleavages to develop.
STV’s ability to aid ‘inter-ethnic’ and ‘cross-ethnic’ voting seems well-suited to
Donald Horowitz, a strong critic of consociationalism. However, Horowitz instead
prefers AV and critiques STV for having the potential for reducing the prospect for interethnic cooperation, given the low threshold needed to win a seat in six-member
constituencies. With a 14.3 per cent threshold that needs to be met for a candidate to be
elected in a constituency, it is easy for hardline candidates to be successful. However,
critically it is important to note that the extent to which STV encourages inter-ethnic
voting is in part dependent on the level of heterogeneity within each constituency. When
the constituencies are more heterogeneous and not subject to gerrymandering, then the
greater the propensity for STV’s inter-ethnic incentives to take hold.
Instead, Horowitz advocates for the use of AV in single member constituencies in
post-conflict states, given the much higher threshold of 50 per cent of the votes +1, in
order for a candidate to be elected in a constituency. This requirement ensures that
predominantly moderate and cross-ethnic candidates win election to office. However, the
threshold may also risk majoritarianism and the under-representation of minority voices.
Therefore Michael Gallagher argues that ‘those prioritizing proportionality, a high degree
of voter participation, and personal accountability of MPs will logically gravitate towards
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PR-STV or open-list PR’ (Gallagher, 2005: 575). With regard to deeply divided societies,
Paul Mitchell notes that STV many ‘offer the best of both worlds’ by combining the
overall fairness of proportionality with some preferential inter-ethnic vote pooling,
countering a critique of PR systems at large (Mitchell, 2013: 2). Simply put:
Electoral systems in which politicians depend on votes only from co-ethnics tend
to reward ethnic extremists who assert maximal demands. Systems in which
politicians seeking election must appeal to members of more than a single ethnic
community and depend on their electoral support generally produce more
moderate politics and reward accommodative politicians with cross-ethnic appeals
(Esman, 1994: 258).
The rare adoption of STV can be attributed to its rarity, which doesn’t encourage
further adoption (Bowler and Grofman, 2000: 18). There exists little understanding about
the full consequences of STV, as results vary across context. In Ireland, STV is blamed
for intraparty factionalism and an ‘excessive attention to localist, particularistic concerns’
(Bowler and Grofman, 2008: 18). However, these characteristics are largely
representative of Irish politics, and are likely to be true regardless of the electoral system
used due to the nature of the development of Irish politics.
Although there have been some moves to replace STV in the Republic of Ireland,
these have failed. Such has been the support for change amongst political elites twice the
government has introduced a referendum on the issue in 1959 and 1968 (Gallagher,
2005). Governing party Fianna Fail introduced the referendum on both occasions,
arguing that FPTP would lead to more effective governance through the ‘winner’s bonus’
it provides to the largest political party. On both occasions the public voted in support of
STV (Gallagher, 2005).
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With regard to STV, the ballot requires a numerate electorate able to access it.9 In
some post-conflict societies this and an explanation as to the operation of the ballot may
prove challenging, particularly in rural areas. Supporters of STV however argue that
voting is no more complicated than explaining the d’Hondt formula or the operation of
the Electoral College in the United States. Indeed, a detailed understanding of the
operation of the electoral process may not be necessary if voters are able to understand
the transparency of the system and that it gives greater voter choice and produces results
that are proportional. The reality of course is that ‘different levels of understanding’ exist
with different stakeholders with any electoral system.
The infrequent use of STV may also be explained by the complexity of the vote
count procedures. In Northern Ireland’s elections, vote count times have consistently
come under significant criticism. In the 2011 election, vote counting continued over two
days with the first result being declared at 7pm, nine hours after voting closed. Voting in
the Mid-Ulster constituency took 27 hours, despite only counting 43,522 votes (BBC,
2011). In total the process of counting the 2 million ballots, based on a turnout of 54.1 per
cent, took two days. This highlights the challenges that could exist in other societies, in
ensuring effective and accurate counting procedures. A failure to achieve these would
have the potential to risk election related violence. The period between voting and
proclamation of results is ‘especially perilous’ (UNDP, 2010: 21). In particular such
violence can involve armed clashes among political parties, violent clashes among groups
of rival supporters and attacks on the property of opponents.
9

Lijphart observed ‘STV is considerably more complicated for the voters than list PR: this is… a considerable problem in developing
societies with large numbers of illiterate or semi-literate voters’ (Lijphart, 1991: 99).
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Conclusion
Moderation on the ethnic issue is a viable strategy only if ethnicity is not salient.
Once ethnicity becomes salient and, as a consequence, all issues are interpreted in
ethnic terms, the rhetoric of cooperation and mutual trust sounds painfully weak.
More importantly, it is strategically vulnerable to flame fanning and the politics of
outbidding. Ceylon and Ulster provide recent examples of the vulnerability of
moderates . . . In Ulster, Protestant extremists, led by the Reverend Ian Paisley,
have held the governing Unionist party in check, rendering moderation
impossible’ (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972: 86).
As Rabushka and Shepsle highlight, the dominance of ethnic identity makes
electoral choice even more challenging. This chapter has highlighted many of the
dilemmas of electoral system choice. Different systems shape different electoral
incentives and have different impacts and provide greater or smaller incentives on issues
such as stability, efficiency, proportionality, and minority representation, amongst many
others.
The next chapter examines the focus of this paper, the STV electoral system in
Northern Ireland. It will examine Northern Ireland’s history and the impact that it and
current societal challenges have had in shaping the development of Northern Ireland’s
electoral processes.
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A History Of Northern Ireland
This chapter begins by examining Northern Ireland’s history of inter-communal
conflict including the phases of conflict. It demonstrates the challenges that exist in
easing tensions between Northern Ireland’s communities, and promoting the cause of
societal conciliation. The second section examines the post-1998 constitutional
consociational framework and the incentives that it might have on political and voter
behavior.
The third section of this chapter examines the application of STV. It looks at the
history of the operation of STV within Northern Ireland, before then examining the
mechanics of how the STV voting system works in Northern Ireland. The chapter
concludes by setting out the structured, focused questions that form the basis of the
examination of each of the four elections in the subsequent chapters.

‘The Troubles’
Over the course of ‘the Troubles’ more than 3,600 people were killed. Of these,
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) killed approximately 1,800, including 465 British army
soldiers, 272 members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and 133 Protestant
civilians (Mulholland, 2002: 76). Other republican factions killed 231 people. Loyalist
individuals and groups killed 990 people, with 708 targeted as Catholic civilians.
Government forces killed 363 people, 145 of whom were republican paramilitaries, and
35

192 civilians (Ibid). Over 1,500 of the total number of victims were killed in Belfast.
More than 600 of these deaths occurred within a small radius of just a few miles of North
Belfast.
In addition to the 3,600 killed, more than 40,000 were injured, 3 per cent of the
population of Northern Ireland (Ibid). By 1998, one in seven members of the Northern
Irish population had been the victim of a violent incident, with this disproportionately
affecting the Catholic community (Ibid). In total since 1972, 17,000 people have been
charged with terrorist offences within Northern Ireland (Ibid).

Phases of Conflict
Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’ began in the late 1960’s and continued until the
1998 signing of the Belfast Agreement. Gerrymandering skewed political representation,
such that Londonderry, a city with a two-thirds Catholic population, was still represented
by a clear majority of Protestants (Coogan, 2003: 473). Amidst anger from the Catholic
community about sustained discrimination by Protestant-dominated governing
institutions against Catholics, civil rights protests began in 1964.
Focal points for protests occurred around employment discrimination against
Catholics, the unfair distribution of social housing by local authorities in Northern Ireland
and discriminatory policing by the RUC. The police were accused of sectarian policing
and were dominated by Protestants, who frequently colluded with unionists.10 The

10

One of the most notable killings of the Troubles was the murder of Patrick Finucane, a Catholic solicitor who had successfully
challenged the British government in several human rights cases in the 1980’s. This included representing hunger striker Bobby
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overlap of the economic inequalities with identity represented a clear case of Northern
Ireland’s Catholic community being subject to ‘horizontal inequalities’ (Stewart, 2000).
One such example was the 1965 decision by the Lockwood Committee on Higher
Education to recommend that a new university should be built in Coleraine (population
12,000), rather than Londonderry (population of 54,000), despite Londonderry only
having one 200-person university. The Lockwood Committee did not contain a single
Catholic, and the Committee therefore took a political (ethnic) decision rather than a
decision based on the academic merits of choosing where to locate the university. The
move resulted in a one-day shutdown of every Catholic school and business in
Londonderry, to no avail (Coogan, 2003: 472-473). As Irish historian Tim Pat Coogan
notes, ‘it struck me that the whole purpose of the northern state was to keep the Unionist
foot firmly down on the Catholic, and that any attempt to remove it would be fiercely
resisted’ (Coogan, 2003: 485).
Whilst ‘The Troubles’ began as a conflict between Catholics and the Protestantdominated state over civil rights, it ultimately escalated into a deep conflict between
unionists and nationalists about the ultimate status and sovereignty of Northern Ireland.
Amidst these protests, the Ulster Volunteer Force, a group of Loyalists, emerged
and used violence, including targeting Catholic civilians as a means to try and achieve its
aims.11 The civil rights marches, described above, increasingly came under attack by
Sands. Finucane was murdered by loyalist paramilitaries. The British Government’s Stevens Report (2003) subsequently found that
the British security services colluded in the murder.
11
Ulster Loyalism is a form of ethnic nationalism that manifested itself as a political ideology. It was found amongst working-class
Protestants in Northern Ireland who opposed a united Ireland and promoted loyalty to the monarchy of the United Kingdom.
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Loyalists, in part due to collaboration with the RUC. A burgeoning civil rights movement
developed, including iconic figures such as Bernadette Devlin, a political activist who
would later become an MP in the House of Commons. A 1968 march in Londonderry
was banned by the Northern Irish government and suppressed through the use of violence
by the RUC. 100 people were injured and the images were broadcast on television,
sparking rioting between the Catholic community and the RUC. From this point onwards,
violence escalated with clashes continuing periodically between members of the Catholic
community and the RUC.
Conflict Escalation
Violence escalated considerably between 1970-72, reaching its peak in 1972
when 500 people were killed, half of these being civilians. The formation of the
Provisional IRA in 1970, a group committed to armed struggle, marked a new level of
escalation and replaced the old IRA that had been committed to non-violence. Under
growing pressure, the British government introduced internment in 1971 within Northern
Ireland. Between 1971 and 1975, 1,981 people were interned with 1,874 of these being
members of the Catholic and republican communities. 107 were Protestant (Melaugh,
2013). There were widespread allegations of abuse within the internment facilities,
something which fuelled further radicalization within marginalized communities.12 On 30
January 1972, 14 unarmed nationalist civil rights demonstrators were shot fatally by the
British Army in Londonderry, a critical moment for the Catholic community.13 The

12

The techniques used, particularly the “Five techniques” were later ruled to be illegal by a British government inquiry.
The events in Londonderry of that day were subject to a public inquiry by the British Government that ran from 1998 to 2010. The
inquiry cost 195m GBP (320m USD) and was the longest ever inquiry in British history. As a result of the inquiry, British Prime
13
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events of that day, known as ‘Bloody Sunday’, led many Catholics to turn further away
from the British Army.
The PIRA became the primary defenders of the Catholic community and mounted
attacks against the British army, carrying out 1,300 bombings in 1972 alone, and also
killing 100 soldiers and wounding 500. The PIRA used bomb attacks primarily to target
citizens, for instance, on “Bloody Friday”, 21 July 1972, when 21 bombs were set off in
Belfast city center alone (Coogan, 2003: 567). The UVF and UDA, unionist and loyalist
paramilitary organizations, responded by targeting Catholics, and citizens were
increasingly forced to ‘self-segregate’ away from mixed areas. Consequently ‘no-go
areas’ sprang up across Northern Ireland. This violence between paramilitary
organizations and the history of discrimination against Catholics led to a “conflict about
the conflict” with a narrative of mutual victimization and perceptions of vulnerability.
The escalation in violence led the British government to introduce direct rule from
London in 1972, suspending the Northern Irish government in order to improve the
security situation. Anger and radicalization in the nationalist communist increased
further, with hunger strikes held by detained nationalist prisoners spurring
demonstrations of nationalist community support (Coogan, 2003: 588). Following the
death of the detained Bobby Sands during his hunger strike, over 100,000 people
attended his funeral (Coogan, 2003: 588).

Minister David Cameron made a formal apology to Parliament about the actions of the British Army that day, noting that the killings
were ‘unjustified and unjustifiable’.
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Violence continued into the 1980’s. In 1983 the PIRA political wing Sinn Fein
took on new impetus as Gerry Adams became leader (Coogan, 2003: 206). It sought a
negotiated end to the conflict, with the conflict increasingly seen as a mutually hurting
stalemate for both sides. After a prolonged period the first ceasefires were agreed in 1994
after a particularly bad year of casualties. Although it initially failed, in part due to IRA
bombings in London and Manchester, it was followed by a second ceasefire in 1997.
Throughout the conflict there were iterative peace making efforts. Since the
introduction of direct rule, there were only two significant peace initiatives that led to
formal agreements. The first was the Sunningdale Agreement which was an attempt to
form a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland and a cross-border Council of
Ireland. It sought to introduce a 78 seat devolved regional Assembly to Northern Ireland,
elected by PR, with the British government retaining control over policing and finance
(Coogan, 2003: 572). The cross-border Council of Ireland would act consultatively on a
small number of policy issues working towards harmonization between the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland. Its members would be made up of a small number of
members of the Northern Irish and Irish Assemblies and equal numbers from the
respective executive bodies (Mulholland, 2002: 96).
The SDLP, UUP and Alliance supported the agreement but other unionists
opposed the agreement. Consequently, the UUP, SDLP and Alliance agreed to form a
power-sharing government (Mulholland, 2002: 95). However, by January 1974 deep
splits within the UUP put the agreement in jeopardy and by May it collapsed following a
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fourteen day general strike led by loyalist organizations in opposition to the Agreement,
which led the UUP members of the Executive to resign (Coogan, 2003: 576). The brief
attempt at devolved government was over and direct rule from London was resumed. The
Sunningdale Agreement would be remarkably similar to the eventual peace agreement in
1998.
In 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement between the British and Irish governments
sought to increase cooperation as a means to begin trying to renew the process of
bringing ‘the Troubles’ to an end (Mulholland, 2002: 117). It gave the Irish government
an advisory role in relation to the resolution of conflict in Northern Ireland and stated that
Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom unless a majority of its
people agreed to join the Republic of Ireland (Mulholland, 2002: 117). Unionists were
firmly opposed this agreement given the role that it gave the Republic of Ireland in
Northern Irish affairs, Consequently, elements of the unionist community engaged in
rallies and civil disobedience in opposition to the Agreement. Addressing a large rally
outside Belfast City Hall on 23 November 1985, DUP leader Ian Paisley summed up
opposition to the Agreement:
Where do the terrorists operate from? From the Irish Republic! That's where they
come from! Where do the terrorists return to for sanctuary? To the Irish Republic!
And yet Mrs Thatcher tells us that that Republic must have some say in our
Province. We say never, never, never, never! (Paisley, 1985).
Ultimately the Agreement did not result in an end to violence or lead to
reconciliation between the two communities. However, it was the first step in ensuring
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enhanced coordination between the British and Irish governments, which was a key
factor in the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998.

The Belfast Agreement and the Referendum
In 1998 the Belfast Agreement was a multi-party agreement signed by most of
Northern Ireland’s parties, and the British and Irish governments on Good Friday, 10
April. The Agreement acknowledged that the majority of the people of Northern Ireland
wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom, but that a substantial amount of people in
Northern Ireland and the majority of the island of Ireland wanted a united Ireland (Belfast
Agreement, 1998). Consequently, it was agreed Northern Ireland would remain part of
the United Kingdom until a majority of Northern Ireland and the Republic agreed
otherwise.
The Agreement restored self-government to Northern Ireland through a devolved
regional Assembly with a power-sharing executive body and a normalization of the
security situation, including the decommissioning of weapons held by paramilitary
groups (Belfast Agreement, 1998). The Agreement was dubbed ‘Sunningdale for Slow
Learners’ by SDLP Deputy Leader Seamus Mallon, given the basis of Sunningdale and
later agreements for developing consensus around what should constitute the eventual
agreement (Downey, 2012). Ultimately, the Ango-Irish cooperation in support of the
peace process, building from the 1985 agreement was a fundamental part of the process.
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Following the Agreement, referendums were held in the Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland on May 22nd 1998. In Northern Ireland 71.1 per cent of the population
voted in support of the Agreement, whilst in the Republic 94.3 per cent supported it
(ARK, 1998). The results in Northern Ireland however saw a significantly higher level of
Catholic rather than Protestant support for the Agreement.
The period 1998-2007 was dominated by stop-start implementation and gridlock
due to the slow-scale of the decommissioning of weapons and some small-scale ongoing
paramilitary activity. Consequently, the Assembly was suspended from 2002 to 2007
with Northern Ireland being ruled from London. Then in 2007, following the St Andrews
Agreement, a ‘post-conflict settlement settlement’ (Du Toit, 2004) after years of
instability and uncertainty, the Assembly was restored. Consequently, the DUP supported
power-sharing for the first time and Sinn Fein supported the PSNI for the first time,
overcoming their historic distrust of policing in Northern Ireland (Owen, 2006). Further,
Sinn Fein and the DUP, traditionally the extremist political parties from the two
communities agreed to a power-sharing government. Consequently, the DUP filled the
position of First Minister and Sinn Fein filled the position of Deputy First Minister. The
power-sharing government became the first administration in post-Agreement Northern
Ireland to complete a full term of office. In 2011, after a four year term of office, a new
election was held.
Given this Northern Ireland’s recent history has been dominated by the legacy of
horizontal inequalities within society and the need for their remediation. With this and the
43

depth of inter-communal violence over 30 years, particularly through the explicit
targeting of civilians from both communities, the lack of social cohesion was severe, and
politics was dominated by deeply polarized political parties. Amidst this context, was the
development of the electoral process.

A History of STV in Northern Ireland
STV was first introduced in the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland in 1920 by
the departing British administration, in order to protect minority populations, particularly
Catholics. In Northern Ireland, STV was used for local elections and for elections in what
was then called the ‘House of Commons of Northern Ireland’, a regional devolved body,
which was subsequently abolished in 1973.
The use of STV did not last long. By 1929, STV had been replaced by FPTP for
Northern Ireland’s elections and was used until 1973 (Coakley, 2009: 253). The
introduction of FPTP served to relegate Northern Ireland’s Catholic population to that of
permanent opposition given that Northern Ireland’s Protestant electorate outnumbered
Catholics by two to one for most of the period (Reilly, 2002: 135). Consequently,
Protestant administrations always dominated the governing bodies, resulting in decades
of discrimination being practiced by Northern Ireland’s governing and administrative
bodies against Catholics in sectors such as employment, education, housing, amongst
many others (Reilly, 2002: 135).
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The British Government reintroduced STV in 1973 for elections to the devolved
administration in Northern Ireland.14 Between 1972 and 1998, only two elections were
held given the levels of violence and inter-communal tensions. The first took place in
1973 and the other in 1982.15 The STV electoral system is currently used for elections to
the Northern Irish Assembly, Local Government (District Council) elections and
elections to the European Parliament.
During the 1998 peace talks the decision was taken to continue using STV
predominantly for two reasons. First, the reaffirming of STV ensured harmony with the
Irish Republic, something that ensured the support of the SDLP, the key nationalist actor
at the negotiations in 1998. It also ensured that clear accountability between
representatives and voters would exist, like the FPTP system used for Westminster
elections, which ensured the support of the UUP, the key unionist actor at the
negotiations (Horowitz, 2002: 213).
Second, the experience of the 1996 Forum election, the election which determined
representation at the peace talks, was formative in encouraging the larger parties to
support STV. The 1996 special election was conducted with a top-up form of PR and led
to smaller cross-ethnic parties such as Alliance, the Women’s Coalition and the Worker’s
Party being represented due to the top-up nature of the electoral system which rewarded

14

STV was re-introduced in 1972 as part of the British government’s response to the Northern Ireland crisis. This included devolution
and power-sharing under the Sunningdale Agreement, which envisioned a power-sharing executive body which would include
Protestant and Catholic interests.
15

The 1973 election saw parties form along ethnic lines and there was no attempt to appeal for votes from the other community. The
basis for winning votes was by appearing ‘hard’ on ethnic issues and any attempts to win votes from the other community would risk
being dubbed ‘soft’. Ultimately, 0.25 per cent of votes crossed the ethnic divide. The power-sharing government fell apart in months
amidst rising violence.
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the 10 largest political parties with a top up seat, enabling parties with geographically
dispersed support to have electoral success. The use of PR resulted in a significant fall in
first preferences for the UUP and the success of many smaller parties, fragmenting
political divisions even further.

Thus, in 1998 the decision to confirm the use of STV was made on the basis of
the perceived complexity of list-PR and the perceived ‘messiness’ of PR in the 1996
elections, given that it was perceived to have ensured the presence of ‘too many’ different
voices at the talks. Critically, this meant that the adoption of STV was not made in order
to induce intergroup accommodation. Instead it was purely seen as a system able to foster
proportional office holding (Horowitz, 2002: 213). Brendan O’Leary argues that had AV
been adopted in Northern Ireland, particularly with a region-wide list system, then the
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) would have won fewer seats than they did under STV in
1998.16 If the nationalist SDLP had come first, the entire agreement would have been
more difficult to implement, particularly given deep unionist concerns about the
agreement, even after a unionist party was elected as the largest political party in the
1998 election (O’Leary: 2002, 313).
The ratification of the use of STV represents a form of path dependence. STV’s
introduction by the British government in both Ireland and Northern Ireland in 1920
meant that STV became associated with accommodative regimes. Although STV was
abandoned in the North in the late 1920’s as the declining unionist population began to

16

In 1998, under STV, the UUP was the largest unionist party and won the most seats, beating the SDLP, the largest nationalist party
by four seats.
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fear for their electoral power, in Ireland, the dominance of nationalists meant that STV
continued to be used (Horowitz, 2003: 212). Given these legacies, and the fact that in the
North both nationalists and unionists associated it with minority office holding, its use
was supported by both sides. Thus by 1998 ‘STV was the natural choice’ for Northern
Ireland given its use in the Republic of Ireland and its perception as historically
facilitating accommodative administrations (Horowitz, 2003: 213).
The decision to use STV after the Agreement was included in the peace
agreement, a rarity, given that only a minority of peace agreements include reference to
the electoral system for the national parliament, as noted in the previous chapter
(Bogaards, 2013: 79). The electoral system choice proved particularly contentious, and
the choice of electoral system was subject to intense negotiations in the early morning of
Good Friday before the announcement of the Agreement. This was largely because the
smaller parties retained a strong preference for constituency-list PR. Ultimately, however
the compromise of increasing the number of representatives in each constituency from
five to six was agreed as a means of lowering the electoral threshold, aiding the potential
for smaller parties to get candidates elected. Nonetheless, there was no difference in level
of support for STV based on group affiliation, with objections to STV only coming from
smaller parties with geographically dispersed support (Horowitz, 2003: 212). Thus, in
Northern Ireland the SDLP, UUP and Alliance all supported STV, whilst smaller parties
preferred a top-up form of PR which had boosted the inclusion of smaller parties,
including loyalist and non-ethnic parties at the peace talks. Thus the focus of discussions
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around STV focused on proportionality, rather than efforts to induce moderation or interethnic cooperation.
STV’s operation is aided by Northern Ireland’s heterogeneous constituencies.17
Currently, there are only 5 out of the 18 constituencies where the respective minority
community makes up less than 20 per cent of the district (Mitchell, 2013: 6). The lack of
gerrymandering in Northern Ireland since the Agreement is key to the effective operation
of the ‘vote-pooling’ incentives that it can encourage.

STV in practice in Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland, voters are able to vote for as many candidates as they wish in
order of preference. Voters declare these preferences numerically, giving a “1” to their
most favored candidate, a “2” for their second most favored candidate and so on.
In order to be elected, a candidate must receive a minimum number of votes. This
minimum is known as ‘the quota’ and is set according to the following formula in each
constituency: dividing the total number of votes cast in each constituency by the number
of seats available to be filled, plus one.

Quota = total number of valid votes cast in constituency

+1

Number of Seats + 1

17

The Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland states that it is an ‘independent and impartial body’. It does not use previous
election results or the consideration of future possible voting patterns in its decision-making. It determines the boundaries of the 18
Westminster seats. These same boundaries are used for Northern Irish Assembly elections to elect six members.
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Therefore in the Lagan Valley constituency in the 2011 Assembly election this was as
follows (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2013):

35,847 total valid votes were cast in the constituency.
6 seats up for election.
35487

+1 = 5070

6+1
Voting papers are initially sorted according to first preferences. Any candidate exceeding
the quota on first preferences alone, 5070 votes in Lagan Valley in 2011, are elected
automatically.
The next stage of the election count is then to transfer the surplus votes of any
candidate who has exceeded the quota, starting with the candidate with the largest
number of votes. This surplus is the number of votes that exceeds the quota. All the
ballots for this winning candidate are examined in order to determine the second
preferences listed on each ballot, so that these can be distributed amongst the other
candidates. The surplus votes are transferred at a fractional value.
In Lagan Valley, the candidate who received the largest number of first
preference votes was Edwin Poots (DUP). Poots received 7329 votes, exceeding the
quota by 2259 votes. These 2259 votes were then redistributed at a fractional value. This
value is determined by calculating the surplus divided by the original number of votes. In
Lagan Valley this meant that:
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2259

= 0.312

7239
Therefore, 0.312 would be multiplied against the total number of second preference votes
that each of Poots’ first preference voters had given to each other candidate. These
second preference votes from Poots are then added to the first preference votes of each of
the other candidates. The votes are then calculated again to determine whether any of
these candidates now have more votes than the original quota needed.
If after this process, all the seats are still not filled, then the candidate with the
least number of votes is eliminated and their votes are transferred and redistributed based
on the second preference votes of those ballots. This process then continues until all the
seats have been filled. Each stage of the counting process is known as a ‘count’.
Given the nature of this process, counting can be long. The vote counting in the
Strangford constituency in the 1998 election went through 18 different counts before the
six candidates were elected. The length of voting in Northern Ireland has been a source of
frequent frustration amongst politicians and voters.

STV within the Consociational Framework
STV operates within the wider context of Northern Irish politics. The 1998
Agreement introduced a system of governance that is ‘strongly consociational’
(Horowitz, 2002: 194). Thus the institutional nature of the Agreement means that
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Northern Irish politics operates with a political framework that meets the four
components of Lijphart’s consociationalism.
This system of governance has a number of important ramifications. Key
Assembly decisions can only be approved on a cross-community basis. This means that
they require either ‘parallel consent’, that is the support of majorities of both unionist and
nationalist delegations within the Assembly or a ‘weighted majority’, comprising at least
60 per cent of all members voting, in addition to at least 40 per cent of each of the
nationalist and unionist delegations (Horowitz, 2002: 194). Given this, MLAs are
required to join one of three blocs upon entering the Assembly – ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’
or ‘other’. This consociational provision makes it significantly more rewarding to be a
member of two of the named communities, and places pressure on those comprising the
‘others’, such as multi-ethnic or non-ethnic parties like the Alliance Party or the
Women’s Coalition (Horowitz, 2002:195). This may affect voter behavior and prove a
consideration for voters in incentivizing them not to vote for multi-ethnic or non-ethnic
parties given the lesser influence they have in the Assembly.
Critics argue that STV may also weaken the intended effects of consociationalism
(Lijphart, 1991). As some candidates under STV come to rely on vote-pooling to ensure
election, STV impinges on the key thinking of consociationalism, the inclusion of
extremes within the system.
In a scenario where a consociational system was designed to include participants
from Party A, Party B, Party C and Party D, STV would affect governing and power
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dynamics. If Party A and Party D represent polar extremes on a political spectrum yet
some candidates from Party A owed their electoral victory to transfer votes from the
more moderate Party B, then this would reduce the very inclusion of extremes from each
party intended by consociationalism. It would also weaken the power of political elites
within the system, reducing their ability to control party candidates, impinging upon the
notion of a ‘cartel of elites’ that Lijphart famously said consociationalism requires
(Lijphart, 1969: 207).
Given the existence of a grand coalition within Northern Ireland, this may also
disincentivize voters from voting for more moderate parties at elections. The position of
First Minister is held by the party with the largest number of Assembly seats, while the
Deputy First Minister is the leader of the second largest party. Given current voting
patterns, this means the First Minister position is held by the leader of the largest unionist
party, while the Deputy First Minister position is held by the leader of the largest
nationalist party.18
This may therefore encourage voters to use their lower order preference votes to
ensure the dominance of their favored party from their own community. Consequently,
this may disincentivize voters from voting for smaller parties given the electoral and
political benefits accrued by ensuring that the largest party in your community maximizes
the number of seats it gains.

18

The First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland are diarchal and the two positions have equal power.
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Consociationalism also limits the opportunities for voters to hold political elites to
account. Currently, Sinn Fein, the DUP, SDLP, UUP and Alliance Party, together all
form Northern Ireland’s government. In total, this means the government controls 102 of
the 108 seats in the Assembly. The opposition controls six seats encompassing five
different political parties, with the largest having two seats.
Therefore it seems that the consociational institutional framework may have a
profound impact in influencing voting behavior and voting preferences. Given the
increasing hybridity of consociational and centripetal institutions and incentives in recent
peace agreements, Northern Ireland provides important lessons for societies facing
similar such challenges.
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Analysis Of The Election Cycles
This section analyses the four election cycles since 1998 using the structured,
focused questions outlined in the methodology section of the introduction. For each
election this includes an examination of the preceding context, the election results, the
extent to which political parties engaged in conciliatory and cross ethnic campaigning as
well as an examination of how small parties performed given the electoral rules. Figure 3
below illustrates the boundaries of Northern Ireland’s 18 constituencies. These
boundaries were consistent for the 1998, 2003 and 2007 elections, and subject to minor
changes for the 2011 election.

Figure 3: Northern Ireland Constituency Map
(Source: Northern Ireland Assembly, 2007)
1998 Election
Preceding Context
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Prior to 1998, most electoral competition had been contained within an ethnic
dual party system. Given voters were committed to either one ethnic bloc or the other,
there were few reasons for parties to moderate, and instead competition occurred within
bloc through ethnic outbidding.
The June 1998 election was the first following the April 1998 Belfast Agreement
and was the first within Northern Ireland’s new post-conflict institutional framework.
Nominations for candidates for the election opened just nine days after the referendum
results were announced approving the peace agreement on May 22, and closed two days
later (Eliott, 1999:145).
Given the proximity to the referendum results, the campaign was largely a rerun
of the arguments that had played out in the debate on the referendum. Therefore the DUP
and UKUP campaigned on their opposition to the Agreement, in particular emphasizing
the ‘moral aspects’ it contained. This centered on anger at the release of prisoners who
had been convicted due to paramilitary activity in exchange for these groups respecting
the ceasefire.
The UUP predominantly campaigned based on its support for the Agreement.
However, of its 48 candidates, six were described as either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ opponents of
the Agreement (Eliott, 1999: 146). The PUP and UDP, loyalist parties, also competed for
unionist votes, meaning that there was vast competition amongst unionist parties, with
five significant unionist parties competing. In the east of the province, competition was
particularly fierce. Within the unionist community there was considerable concern about
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the implementation of the peace agreement including concerns about the timetable for
weapons decommissioning by nationalist paramilitary groups and the role of republican
armed groups in the peace process at large.
The SDLP and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, known previously for its
‘armalite and ballot box strategy’19 both supported the Agreement and campaigned based
on this. Prior to the election, the SDLP rejected a proposal from Sinn Fein for an electoral
pact on the basis that both parties were pro-Agreement and that a formal pact was
unnecessary given the preferential nature of the electoral system (Elliott, 1999:146).
The Alliance Party and the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) both
campaigned to try to win the center ground. It was notable that five of the NIWC’s eight
candidates ran in strong areas of Alliance support, highlighting that their campaigning
was centered on intra-centrist competition.

19

The strategy emerged in 1981 with Sinn Fein contesting elections in the Irish Republic and the Republic of Ireland, whilst the IRA
continued armed struggle.
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Election Results
Table 1: 1998 Election Results
Party
SDLP
UUP
DUP
Sinn Féin
Alliance
UKUP
PUP
NIWC
Independent
Unionist
Candidates

Number of First
Preference Votes
177,963 votes
172,225 votes
146,989 votes
142,858 votes
52,636 votes
36,541 votes
20,634 votes
13,019 votes

Percentage of First
Preference Votes
21.97%
21.25%
18.14%
17.63%
6.50%
4.51%
2.55%
1.61%

Number of Seats
Won
24 seats
28 seats
20 seats
18 seats
6 seats
5 seats
2 seats
2 seats

23,089 votes

2.85%

3 seats

Figure 4: Percentage of First Preference Votes (1998)
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Figure 5: Percentage of Seats Received (1998)
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The election produced a pro-peace power-sharing government. 75.5 per cent of
votes cast went to candidates who supported the peace agreement, a four per cent
increase from the referendum. This 75.5 per cent of the vote converted into 80 of the 108
seats. 28 seats went to anti-Agreement candidates, all of who were unionists (Mulholland,
2002: 146). The 28 seats won was two short of the number required to be able to veto
within the Assembly. The 28 elected consisted of 20 DUP candidates, five UKUP
candidates and three independents. As a result, anti-Agreement unionists had won the
same number of seats as the pro-Agreement UUP won.
Splits within the UUP and unionism as a whole on support for the Agreement
meant that they had been unable to maintain a united front, contributing to the UUP’s
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second place finish based on the number of first preference votes. Furthermore, the large
number of unionist parties meant that there was fierce competition for votes and SDLP’s
first place finish was largely enabled by what UUP leader David Trimble called ‘vote
shredding’ within unionism. The term ‘vote shredding’ emerged in the 1996 elections to
the peace talks when there was considerable concern about the ‘shredding of the unionist
vote’ due to the depth of intra-unionist competition that reduced the electoral success of
the UUP.
The UUP won one per cent fewer votes than the SDLP, the first time a unionist
party had not won the most votes. This seemed to support the view of Lijphart that the
intra-party choices allowed by STV ballots ‘negatively affects party cohesion, which in
turn negatively affects interparty negotiations’ (Lijphart, 1991: 99).20 Their larger seat
tally however allowed them to secure the position of First Minister. The small loyalist
parties, such as the UKUP and the PUP, a working-class, pro-agreement unionist party
won a small number of seats. UKUP won five seats, the PUP two.
On the nationalist side, the SDLP was the largest party receiving six seats more
than Sinn Fein’s 18. Overall, Catholic voter turnout was significantly higher than
previously. In 1992, the ratio between Protestant-Catholic voting was 70:30, in 1998 it
was 55:45 (McGrattan, 2010: 166). Finally, the multi-ethnic Alliance Party won six seats
and the NIWC two seats.

20

This would be one of the few cases where there would be clear intra-party competition. In contrast, one of the biggest complaints of
the operation of STV in the Republic of Ireland is the extent of competition between candidates of the same party.
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The implementation of the peace agreement was of deep concern to both
communities. Unionists were deeply unhappy with the early release of prisoners and
‘horrified’ at the ‘rebranding’ of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Northern Ireland’s police
force, including the use of positive discrimination to ensure Catholic representation in the
police (Mulholland, 2002: 146). The IRA did not want to appear the defeated party, and
therefore refused to ease unionist concerns through the early decommissioning of
weapons (Mulholland, 2002: 146).
Conciliation
In the election, 26 of the 108 Assembly members were elected on first preference
votes alone. Therefore, 76 per cent of Assembly members needed lower preferences in
order to be elected (Mitchell, 2013: 7).21
During the campaign, there had been talk about the development of a pro versus
anti-Agreement cleavage. Seamus Mallon, deputy leader of the SDLP, had said that
voting for other pro-Agreement parties, including unionist parties, had to be considered
(Eliott, 1999: 148). However, analysis of the vote transfer pattern revealed it to be a
traditional election and possibly the most communal voting pattern since the
reintroduction of STV in 1973 (Eliott, 1999: 148). Despite this 1998 saw a 5 per cent
increase in unionist transfers to the SDLP, with a similar increase in SDLP transfers to
pro-peace UUP candidates (Tonge, 2005: 113), showing that a small number of voters
did seek to reward moderates and those who supported peace.

21

In subsequent elections on average 30% of MLA’s have been elected on first preferences alone.
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Preferential voting facilitated moderation within the unionist community. AntiAgreement unionist voters were able to initially vote for the DUP (the anti-agreement
unionist party), but then use their lower preference votes to support other members of the
unionist community who were pro-Agreement. This effect reduced the number of seats
that anti-Agreement unionist parties won in 1998. The lower order preferences of those
voters initially supporting anti-Agreement candidates served to reinforce more moderate
candidates. Given this, STV proved to be the principal reason that a workable assembly
emerged from the 1998 elections (Evans and O’Leary, 1999: 3-4) as demonstrated by
Table 2 below, and the subsequent pie charts in Figures 6 and 7. STV transfers turned a
0.5 per cent lead in support for anti-Agreement candidates in the first preference count of
unionists against the agreement into a 1.8 per cent pro-Agreement Assembly majority of
unionist representatives.

Table 2: Assembly Results by Support for the Belfast Agreement.
(Source: O’Leary, 1999: 297)
Bloc
All
Nationalists
All others
All 'Yes'
Unionists
All 'No'
Unionists

Percentage First
Preference Vote

Number of
Assembly Seats

Percentage of
Assembly Seats

39.8

42

38.9

9.4

8

7.3

25

30

27.7

25.5

28

25.9
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Figure 6: Percentage of First Preference Vote by Support for the Belfast Agreement
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Figure 7: Percentage of Seats Won by Support for the Belfast Agreement
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Vote transfer patterns emerged largely from voters themselves, rather than being
dictated by party elites.22 Although some pro-agreement parties, particularly on the

22

This is in contrast to the operation of STV within the Republic of Ireland, where cooperative campaign strategies featuring
reciprocal preference-swapping between candidates, sometimes as part of pre-election vote-pooling deals, can be a key part of the
election campaign.
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nationalist side, did advocate for transferring votes to pro-peace candidates, there were no
pre-election pacts like those that operate in other countries. There was no formal
agreement between the SDLP and Sinn Fein, despite Gerry Adam’s call for one
(Mitchell, 2013: 9). This however is unsurprising. As Horowitz has noted the threshold
for winning a seat in a multi-member STV constituency is usually too low to encourage
parties to promote preference swapping as a strategy (Horowitz, 1991: 191). Nonetheless,
given the stakes of the 1998 election there was some informal messaging by political
elites as to how to use preferences despite the lack of formal electoral pacts.
In 1998 there was some evidence of voters using their lower preference votes to
support pro-peace parties. Overall however there was little evidence of a willingness to
cross the confessional line and instead voting patterns remained ‘highly communal’
(Elliott, 1999: 149). However, the SDLP suggested to supporters that they should use
their transfers to support pro-Agreement parties rather than allowing anti-Agreement
parties such as the DUP and UKUP to increase their representation (O’Leary, 2002: 316).
In a speech at Belfast’s Clarendon dock during the week of the election SDLP leader
John Hume remarked:
Your transfers to other `Yes' (pro-Agreement) candidates will keep the wreckers
out because those who have said `No' provide no alternative. They are yesterday's men
(BBC, 1998).
Given the strong competition between the DUP and the UUP and the risk of
ethnic outbidding, the UUP did not recommend transfers to the SDLP. Instead, UUP
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leader David Trimble suggested that UUP voters should make up their minds based on
local circumstances (Breen, 1998). Although the key element in the signing of the peace
agreement had been the cooperation between SDLP and UUP, vote transfers between the
two were not substantial. A RTE/UMS exit poll revealed that only 1 per cent of SDLP
voters would give a second preference to another party and only 4 per cent would give a
third preference (Eliott, 1999: 148). For UUP voters the figures were 1 and 3 per cent
respectively.
There were six terminal transfers from SDLP candidates to UUP candidates.23
The unionists received on average 10.3 per cent of the transfer vote. There were six
terminal transfers from UUP candidates and on average SDLP candidates received 24.4
per cent of the transfers. The constituency results show that no UUP candidates were
elected as a direct result of SDLP transfers. However, the election of Danny O'Connor
(SDLP) in East Antrim was the direct result of a favorable set of terminal transfer votes
from Ken Robinson (UUP), which left DUP candidate Jack McKee, as runner up. In
Newry and Armagh, the redistribution of Danny Kennedy's (UUP) surplus assisted John
Fee and Frank Feely (SDLP).
Given this, Reilly has argued that there was ‘striking evidence that the
representation of moderate sentiment in the Assembly was greatly assisted by Northern
Ireland’s STV electoral system’ in 1998 (Reilly, 2001: 137), something that is supported
by the evidence outlined above. Overall though, intra-bloc transfers dominated. SDLP

23

A terminal transfer is ‘a situation in which the party of the candidate whose vote is being transferred no longer has a candidate
available to receive transfers (i.e.. the parties’ other candidates have all either already been elected or eliminated’) (Mitchell, 2013: 8).
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terminal transfers to Sinn Fein averaged 56 per cent, whilst 70 per cent of transfers from
Sinn Fein candidates went to SDLP candidates (Eliott, 1999: 148).
STV also enabled voters who supported ethnic sectarian parties such as DUP and
Sinn Fein, to give transfers to more moderate political parties. DUP terminal transfers to
UUP were 4 per cent for instance, whilst UUP transfers to DUP were 31 per cent. The
transfers from loyalist parties such as PUP and UDP went predominately to the moderate
UUP. Hence, overall votes were highly communal, with little sense of the new political
cleavage of pro- and anti-Agreement. However, such transfer patterns did benefit
moderate candidates within each community, while also showing that some UUP voters
were willing to reinforce the more extreme DUP.
Given these effects, vote transfers in the 1998 election served to provide a ‘seatbonus’ to more moderate ethnic political parties, particularly the SDLP and UUP, who
came to be ‘over-represented’ in the Assembly in comparison to their vote share. This
was particularly clear in the case of the UUP, which won 21 per cent of the vote, but 26
per cent of the seats. Therefore this provides clear evidence that:
Some of the SDLP’s and Sinn Fein’s voters found it rational to reward David
Trimble’s UUP for making the agreement by giving its candidates their lowerorder preferences […] likewise, some of the UUP’s and PUP’s voters transferred
their lower-order preferences to pro-agreement candidates within their own bloc,
amongst the others, and amongst nationalists [… ] Within bloc rewards for
moderation also occurred (O’Leary, 1999: 10).
In East Antrim, the biggest shock of the election was the successful election of
Danny O’Connor (SDLP). O’Connor was the only SDLP local councilor and there was
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little nationalist support in the constituency. O’Connor initially finished in eighth place
on first preference votes, but ultimately finished in sixth due to transfers and was elected.
It was the closest of the entire election and O’Connor edged out the next candidate by just
49 votes, highlighting the closeness of the race. An analysis of the vote shows that
transfers from the sole Sinn Fein candidate, the elimination of the Alliance candidate, and
from the elimination of UUP candidates helped O’Connor to win.
The East Antrim race demonstrates a number of different aspects of voter
behavior. O’Connor was aided by intra-bloc transfers following the elimination of the
Sinn Fein candidate. O’Connor was aided by transfers following the elimination of the
multi-ethnic Alliance candidate. Finally, he benefited from cross-community transfers in
support of moderation from vote transfers from eliminated UUP candidates. Such voter
behavior is suggestive of strategic voting within the constituency. East Antrim is a
unionist stronghold, and in this race four of the remaining five seats went to unionist
politicians. O’Connor’s victory edged out a DUP candidate. Given the anti-Agreement
campaign platform of the DUP it is unsurprising that moderates such as UUP and
Alliance supporters and nationalists would seek to deny a DUP candidate from electoral
success.
Although transfer patterns in East Antrim helped to moderate the winning
candidate slate, in the Strangford constituency such patterns were less successful. Sole
SDLP candidate Danny McCarthy polled strongly in first preference votes, finishing
seventh. However, he failed to gain many transfer votes, and McCarthy finished in
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seventh place, even after lower-order transfers from 18 different candidates had been
transferred to him. Instead, two DUP, two UUP, a UKUP candidate and an Alliance Party
candidate were elected. In this constituency, unionists used their transfers to secure
enough votes to deny the SDLP winning a seat. In this instance, there was clearly no
appetite for using transfers to support a SDLP candidate, most likely due to the lack of a
credible threat from a Sinn Fein candidate.
In many constituencies transfers were used predominantly to support-intra party
candidates. In East Belfast, Sammy Wilson (DUP) was elected after initially winning just
633 first preference votes. However, he was able to rely on 3,853 transfer votes from then
DUP Deputy Leader Peter Robinson given that DUP supporters had stacked many of
their first preference votes on Robinson. The next largest number of transfers Wilson
received was 87.
Cross-Ethnic Coalition Building
Table 3: Performance of Small Parties in 1998
Party
Alliance
UKUP
PUP
NIWC
UDP
Labour
Ind Unionists

Number of First
Preference Votes
52,636 votes
36,541 votes
20,634 votes
13,019 votes
8,651 votes
2,729 votes
23,089 votes

Percentage of First
Preference Votes
6.50%
4.51%
2.55%
1.61%
1.07%
0.34%
2.85%
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Number of Seats
6 seats
5 seats
2 seats
2 seats
0 seats
0 seats
3 seats

Figure 8: Percentage of Seats Won by Small Parties
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A number of smaller parties ensured electoral success, as demonstrated by Table
3 and Figure 8. Alliance won six seats and NIWC two with both benefiting from transfers
from both sides of the political divide. Fringe ethnic parties such as the UKUP, PUP and
three independent unionist candidates also achieved electoral success. Alliance and
NIWC were the clear recipient of transfer votes from each side of the sectarian divide
such that they received far more transfers than there were transfers across the divide
(Reilly, 2001: 138). Overall, the election was seen as a breakthrough for the UKUP and
NIWC, but a disappointment for Alliance.

•

Alliance

Alliance won six seats in the election, a disappointing result, as they picked up
just three thousand more first preference votes than they had in the 1996 election that
determined representation at the peace talks. It was also notable that Alliance didn’t win a
seat in a constituency where nationalists won more than one of the six seats. Of those
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constituencies where Alliance won one seat with a single nationalist representative, it was
always an SDLP rather than Sinn Fein candidate.
In East Belfast and in Lagan Valley, Alliance won a seat by exceeding the
electoral quota purely with first preferences. In East Belfast, the other five winners were
two DUP candidates, two UUP candidates and a PUP candidate. With only one SDLP
candidate running, and one Sinn Fein candidate, many nationalist voters may have
supported APNI with their first preference vote given a lack of credible likelihood of a
nationalist candidate winning. Instead the evidence is suggestive that they voted in order
to partially moderate the slate of winning candidates.
In contrast, in South Antrim, Alliance’s David Ford was reliant on UUP transfers
to win as the UUP sought to hold off a nationalist challenge. In Strangford, Kieran
McCarthy of Alliance was also elected by pulling in a large number of unionist transfers.
Having initially come fourth on first preferences with 2,947, McCarthy received a steady
number of transfers from across the community, before receiving a large 2,298 transfers
from the elimination of Peter Osborne, his running mate. This enabled the defeat of
Danny McCarthy (SDLP), the only credible nationalist candidate in the constituency,
who came seventh, as mentioned above.

•

Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition

The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition was ‘the most widespread beneficiary
of lower-order preferences’ winning two seats, despite a very low first-preference vote
(O’Leary, 2002: 316). The NIWC benefited from transfers because of its inclusive
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orientation towards both republicans and loyalists leading it to reap a more diverse array
of transfers than Alliance, who predominantly gained transfers from middle class UUP
and SDLP supporters. Instead, Monica McWilliams and Jane Morrice received transfers
from supporters of every party (O’Leary, 2002: 316).
Monica McWilliams won a seat in South Belfast after winning only 3,912 first
preference votes, in a constituency where the electoral quota proved to be 5,898.
McWilliams benefited most greatly following the elimination of Sinn Fein’s Sean Hayes,
the only Sinn Fein candidate in the constituency, which resulted in the transfer of 516
votes to McWilliams. Given that in the event the UUP won two seats, DUP one and
SDLP two, in addition to the NIWC’s seat, such voting is suggestive of a clear use of
lower order votes by some voters to support NIWC rather than a party from across the
divide once their own preferred candidate was elected.
After all the transfer votes had been taken into account, Steve McBride of
Alliance finished seventh, just fifty votes behind McWilliams, and Myreve Chambers
finished in eighth place. The result highlighted the extent of NIWC-Alliance competition
and also that nationalist voters had a preference for transferring their votes to NIWC over
Alliance candidates given NIWC’s status as a non-ethnic party in comparison to
Alliance’s implicit endorsement of unionism. This transfer pattern took root after Sinn
Fein supporters had initially used their subsequent preferences to try to support SDLP
candidates. The two SDLP candidates benefited from the elimination of Sinn Fein’s Sean
Hayes with Alasdair McDonell receiving 890 transfers and Carmel Hanna 823.
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The victory of Jane Morrice in North Down is also suggestive of this. North
Down is a unionist stronghold and the election resulted in the best UUP performance in
the entire election. Three UUP candidates, a UKUP candidate, an Alliance candidate and
Morrice were elected. Given unionism’s strength, no Sinn Fein candidates ran and only
one SDLP candidate did. Morrice polled only 1,808 first preference votes in the election.
Given this, patterns of strategic voting are clear. Following the elimination of SDLP
candidate Marietta Farrell, 1811.89 of her 2458.10 votes transferred to Morrice, resulting
in her election rather than Alan Graham of the DUP. Morrice was elected with 4897.71
votes. Although Morrice received diffuse support from a number of other candidates, the
scale of the lower-transfers from supporters of SDLP candidates provided her significant
support. Although she received 1277.82 other lower order transfers, these came from 12
other candidates representing 15 different political parties.

•

UKUP

The UKUP was formed in 1995. Unlike other unionist parties, the UKUP was
fully opposed to devolution and believed Northern Ireland should be ruled from London.
It was fiercely critical of the decision of the British government to allow Sinn Fein to
participate in the Northern Irish government prior to disarming. The UKUP also opposed
reforms to policing in Northern Ireland. It won five seats, with each win occurring
predominantly in unionist strongholds. In each of the five constituencies where they
picked up a single seat, other unionist parties won at least three of the six seats.
Supporters of UKUP and DUP candidates frequently engaged in vote-swapping given
both held an anti-Agreement orientation
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•

Independent Unionists

Three independent dissident unionist candidates won election by running on an
anti-Agreement platform. Once in power, they formed the United Unionist Coalition. In
Upper Bann, Denis Watson won and became leader of the UUC, a loose movement rather
than a conventional political party. In 2000 he joined the DUP whilst still retaining
leadership of the UUC. This move epitomized the manner in which in just four years the
DUP became the standard bearer for the unionist community. Critical to the success of
these candidates was their ability to glean unionist transfers, as in the case of Boyd
Douglas in East Londonderry and Fraser Agnew in North Belfast, who defeated Martin
Morgan of the SDLP by just 289 votes in North Belfast. Critical to Agnew’s victory was
the transfer of 1117.13 transfer votes following the elimination of Eric Smyth (DUP).

•

PUP

The pro-agreement PUP was a political party intended to represent the interests of
loyalist working-class communities and the party enjoyed strong links with the Ulster
Volunteer Force, a loyalist paramilitary group.24 The PUP won two seats. It had been
formed in 1996 and criticized the DUP and UUP for their abandonment of the Protestant
working-class. It sought to promote a policy of holistic conflict transformation. The PUP
benefited from transfers from other moderate unionists given its moderate policy
positions. In contrast, rival loyalist party, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) failed to
win any seats. The UDP had traditionally advocated independence for Northern Ireland,
separate from the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, the only unionist party to
24

The UVF only disarmed and decommissioned its weapons in 2009.
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do so. Splits within the UDP and the number of other unionist parties meant that the UDP
was marginalized electorally.

Summary Analysis
As expected, STV produced a highly proportional result. In 1998, there was some
evidence of STV aiding pro-peace agreement candidates through transfers within each
community. STV was particularly effective in encouraging political inclusion both in
voter turnout and representation. Thus it allowed unionist voters to back an antiagreement candidate with their first preference vote and then a pro-agreement candidate
with a subsequent vote. This ensured voter turnout whilst also reinforcing the political
center, ultimately proving critical by transforming a slight first preference vote plurality
amongst unionists favoring anti-Agreement candidates, into a slight bias in seat
representation towards pro-Agreement unionists through the transfer process.
Transfers between SDLP and UUP candidates also occurred on a small scale,
supporting pro-Agreement politicians, conforming with the inter-ethnic vote pooling that
Donald Horowitz would envision through a preferential electoral system. Despite the
relatively small scale of such patterns, these should not be underestimated given the
proximity to the Belfast Agreement. Such behavior most prominently occurred in a
strategic ethnic context, with the clearest examples of SDLP-UUP vote swapping
occurring as a means to cooperate in order to deny a more extreme candidate such as
from Sinn Fein or the DUP from power. Sinn Fein attracted few transfer votes even from
other nationalists, with its 19 per cent of the first preference vote only translating into 17
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per cent of the Assembly’s seats. This is unsurprising given continuing concern about
Sinn Fein’s role in the peace process and the role of the IRA.
Transfers enabled smaller parties to enjoy limited success in 1998. Alliance relied
on transfers from unionist candidates for much of its success, whilst the NIWC enjoyed
transfers from nationalist supporters once their candidates were eliminated, particularly
as they sought to strategically deny unionists from gaining further political
representation. The 1998 election proved the best for the smaller parties before the
consolidation of the political spectrum by the larger parties. Thus, whilst voters remained
wedded to their ethnic identities and voted for ethnic political parties, preferential voting
did enable transfers to support more moderate candidates as a means of denying political
parties from the other community from gaining further representation.
Thus, this suggests that voting patterns are reliant on a pool of accommodative
voters willing to transfer lower-preference votes outside of their core support in support
of centrist candidates from within and outside the community who have a clear political
space to operate in, as Reilly argues (Reilly, 2001, 139). However, in some cases these
patterns were more reflective of calculated strategic voting, rather than truly
accommodative behavior.
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2003 Election
Preceding Context
The period 1998 to 2003 was marked by several disruptions to the activities of the
assembly due to the refusal of unionists to participate in the government until the IRA
had discontinued its paramilitary activities. Further, it took more than a year between the
election and the appointment of the Northern Irish Executive.
The Assembly and Executive were eventually established in December 1999 on
the understanding that the decommissioning of weapons would begin immediately. The
lack of progress on decommissioning saw the Assembly suspended just two months later
for a period of three months. Continued paramilitary activity associated with the
Provisional IRA continued to damage the image of Sinn Fein, particularly as IRA
members continued to engage in organized crime and extra-judicial violence.
Given these developments, approval of the Agreement within the unionist
community was threatened significantly. In 2002, the UUP resigned from the powersharing government following the arrests of a number of Sinn Fein personnel for
gathering information at the Stormont Parliament to be used for terrorism. Uncertainty
and the mistrust of nationalists by many in the unionist community was something that
the DUP seized on during the 2003 election.
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Election Results
Table 4: 2003 Election Results

Party
DUP
SF
UUP
SDLP
Alliance
PUP
Kieran
Deeny
NIWC
UKUP

Number of
First
Preference
Votes
177470
162758
156931
117547
25372
8032

Percentage
of First
Preference
Votes
25.60%
23.50%
22.70%
17.00%
3.70%
1.20%

6158

0.90%

5785
4794

0.80%
0.70%

Percentage
Change in
Vote Since
1998
7.50%
5.90%
1.40%
-0.0005
-0.00028
-1.40%
-0.80%
-3.80%

Seats

Change in
Seats

30
24
27
18
6
1

10
6
-1
-6
+/- 0
-1

1

1

0
1

-2
-4

The 2003 election marked the beginning of the transformation of Northern Irish
politics as can be seen in Table 4 above. After the introduction of the consociational
constitutional framework, the ethno-national cleavage had ensured its primacy as the
dominant vote determining cleavage in the unionist bloc, reducing further the role of
other factors such as class, or social background (Tilley et al., 2008) The suspension of
the Assembly four times between 1998 and 2003 served to increase polarization further.
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Figure 9: Percentage of First Preference Votes
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Figure 10: Percentage Share of Seats
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The 2003 election was a critical juncture in the Northern Irish peace process.
Overall support for the Agreement amongst Protestants had fallen from 57 per cent in the
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1998 referendum to one-third (Tonge, 2006: 199). The election saw voters reward the
‘extremist’ parties, and the DUP and Sinn Fein became the largest political parties in the
Assembly. In the election, the DUP gained a further ten seats and Sinn Fein six seats. The
DUP’s gains predominantly came from smaller unionist parties rather than from the UUP
but it was the first time ever in a Northern Irish election that the DUP had beaten the
UUP.25 The UUP’s percentage share of the vote nonetheless increased slightly, although
they lost one MLA. On the nationalist side, the SDLP’s performance was the worst since
1973. The increase in support for the DUP and Sinn Fein further reduced the size of the
center ground, with the Northern Ireland Woman’s Coalition drastically losing their
support.
Sinn Fein finished second with a big increase in its vote, increasing its first
preference vote by 33 per cent from 1998. The SDLP lost 23 per cent of its first
preference vote compared to 1998. The UUP and the SDLP were relegated into third and
fourth place, a remarkable fall from grace. Northern Ireland’s smaller parties were
decimated; the Women’s Coalition, the United Unionist Coalition and the Northern
Ireland Unionist Party lost most of their support, whilst the Progressive Unionist Party
and UK Unionist Party won just one seat each. The Alliance Party saw its vote halved,
though it retained six seats, the same number as in 1998. After the election, the Assembly
remained suspended until 2007. However, the 2003 election did result in Sinn Fein

25

In 1998, UKUP had won five seats, PUP one and Independent Unionists three. This time those parties won two seats. The NIWC
won two seats in 1998 but none in 2003.

78

ministers being appointed to the Education and Health departments, something which
was too much for many DUP supporters (Tonge, 2006: 199).26

Conciliation
The implementation difficulties of the 1998 Agreement became an ‘electoral
liability’ for the UUP and an opportunity for the DUP (Mitchell et al: 2009, 404). The
DUP’s behavior by 2003 was a combination of anti-system behavior and a desire to
amplify its ethnic tribune appeal. This anti-system behavior only ended in 2007 when the
DUP agreed to lead a power-sharing government with Sinn Fein. Ultimately, relative
perceptions of the effectiveness of each party in representing ethno-national interests was
important in the electoral emergence of the historically extreme political parties.
After coming close to outright rejectionism, the DUP achieved its electoral
success in 2003 by focusing predominantly on elements of the Agreement that were
opposed by a majority of pro-Agreement UUP members. These included policing reforms
and prisoner releases. Rather than moderating as Sinn Fein had done, instead the DUP
achieved success by blaming the UUP for weaknesses in the implementation of the
agreement, in particular for the concessions that had been made to the IRA and
nationalist paramilitaries. Instead, the DUP portrayed itself as the defender of Unionism,
whilst also subtly moderating its campaign messaging, for instance calling for
renegotiation rather than rejection of the Belfast Agreement.

26

In Northern Ireland since 1998, the number of Cabinet positions held by each party has been decided using the d’hondt formula and
a similar process is used for determining which department they run.
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By 2003, only 10 per cent of Protestants agreed with the statement that ‘the
Agreement is basically right and just needs to be implemented in full’ (Kennedy and
Farrington, 2005: 103-4). A BBC poll in October 2002 found that only 33 per cent of
Protestants backed the Belfast Agreement overall (BBC, 2002). Finally, the 2003
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey found that only 32 per cent of respondents felt
that unionists and nationalists had benefited equally. 48 per cent believed nationalists had
benefited more than unionists, and only two per cent felt unionists had benefited more
than nationalists (Life and Times Survey, 2003).
The anger within the unionist community about the lack of a peace divided for the
unionist community was highlighted by the PUP’s 2003 election manifesto, entitled
‘How long are you prepared to wait for the benefits for our community?’ (PUP, 2003).
This stemmed from a clear sense that the Agreement was predominantly delivering
benefits to the nationalist community. The DUP subsequently capitalized on this,
including through the use of scare tactics in the campaign, such as the DUP’s statement
that ‘we are closer to a united Ireland than we have ever been’ (Tonge, 2006: 204). This
appeared a gross mischaracterization of the reality. The DUP also proposed seven
‘principles’ and ‘tests’ for a new agreement, which struck a chord with many in the
unionist community. This built on the DUP’s pre-existing reputation as a party with the
‘brand identity’ of ‘no surrender’ and more broadly, ‘no’ on policy concessions to
nationalists (Mitchell et al, 2009: 404).
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The DUP and Sinn Fein began as anti-system parties but over the course of the
1990’s and early 2000’s transitioned into parties willing to work within the powersharing institutions as the best means of ensuring their long-term success (Mitchell et al,
2010: 403). Sinn Fein’s experience in local elections during the 1980’s was key in
encouraging this process. Frequently, Sinn Fein candidates with a high number of first
preference votes were usurped by other candidates who received a smaller number of first
preferences but much more cross-community support, particularly SDLP candidates
(Taylor, 2007: 64). As a result, the failure to achieve electoral success encouraged Sinn
Fein to moderate including by supporting the peace process and the decommissioning of
the IRA. By 2003, 70 per cent of SDLP first preference supporters transferred their lower
preferences to support Sinn Fein candidates (Tonge, 2006: 170). In 2003, both the DUP
and Sinn Fein gained from substantial vote transfers and first preference switching from
members of the moderate parties in their respective communities (Mitchell et al, 2010:
407). The 2003 election would represent the beginning of the marginalization of the UUP
and SDLP by DUP and Sinn Fein success. The strengthening of Sinn Fein was
unsurprising given the success that the nationalist community had achieved between 1998
and 2003.
For the UUP, their decision to enter government after 1998 with Sinn Fein
‘proved catastrophic’ (Tonge, 2006: 177), and led many who had supported to start
voting for the DUP. Despite divisions within unionism, unionists kept their transfers
within the unionist bloc even if it meant pro-Agreement supporters supporting antiAgreement candidates. Of unionist voters, DUP voters were extremely loyal. In the 1998
81

and 2003 elections approximately 80 per cent of their lower-order votes went to other
DUP candidates (Tonge, 2006: 178).
The DUP sought to bolster its position as the defender of unionism by appealing
to all unionists, not just its traditional supporters. In 2003, the DUP’s election manifesto
entitled ‘Towards A New Agreement?’ highlighted the DUP’s anger at the current state
of the Agreement, something that resonated with the unionist community as a whole.
This was a critical policy change. Whilst previously the DUP had rejected the
Agreement, in 2003 it called for ‘renegotiation’, enabling it to mobilize the base but also
woo disenchanted UUP voters not willing to countenance full rejection of the Agreement.
At the same time the UUP leader David Trimble continued to support the Agreement
despite the failure of the IRA to start and subsequently complete weapons
decommissioning (Mitchell and Evans, 2009: 157).
The DUP focused on opposition to moral elements of the Agreement, including
prisoner exchanges and the inclusion of ‘terrorists’ in the new government. It also
criticized the all-Ireland elements of the Agreement. The DUP also weakened the
position of the UUP and PUP by accusing them of undermining the political process
(Frost, 2006: 19). The DUP was also aided by its ability to capitalize on the rivalry
between and within other unionist parties. The UKUP was marred by splits that saw four
of the five MLA’s resign from the party.27 They subsequently failed to achieve reelection.

27

On 5 January 1999, all four UKUP MLA’s except leader Kieran McCartney resigned and formed the Northern Ireland Unionist
Party, leaving McCartney as the sole UKUP representative in the assembly. This move in response to McCartney’s proposal that if
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Amidst the DUP’s increasing prominence within the unionist community, Sinn
Fein sought to assert its position within the nationalist community. Its manifesto entitled
‘Agenda for Government’ demonstrated its centrality to the peace process. The first line
epitomized what would come to be the key means of carrying Sinn Fein to electoral
success for the next decade. Under the title ‘Making a difference’ it read,
Over the last five years, Sinn Fein has consistently delivered in government, in
our communities and in negotiations on the peace process (Sinn Fein, 2003).
The focus on ‘consistent delivery’ and standing up for nationalism enabled Sinn
Fein to dominate nationalism over the years to come. Whilst republicans had been able to
delay weapons decommissioning in full until 2005, at the same time Sinn Fein had
secured significant concessions on police reform, prisoner exchanges and the reduction of
British troops based in Northern Ireland.
On police reform, Sinn Fein secured numerous concessions despite it refusing to
officially support the PSNI until after the 2007 St Andrews Agreement. By 2001 the
RUC had been renamed the PSNI to reflect a more community-focused model of
policing, and the uniform, badge, and symbology of the PSNI had been transformed to
demonstrate a commitment to cross-community equality. New oversight mechanisms of
the police were introduced as part of nearly 200 recommendations being implemented to
transform the RUC. Thus, not only did Sinn Fein have clear accomplishments to stand on
but also the ability to campaign on the need for future reforms, such that the first 33
Sinn Fein took up its seats in the power sharing executive without prior Provisional Irish Republican Army decommissioning of
weapons then the UKUP members should resign their seats in protest.

83

pages of its manifesto were devoted to its response to the Agreement. Education, health
and the economy combined together comprised a further 20 pages. In contrast, the 2003
SDLP manifesto was seen by many as ‘post-nationalist’, focused on government services,
with its key priorities being public services, growth, developing employment skills, and
job creation, rather than the constitutional change emphasized by Sinn Fein.
This divergence in both nationalist messaging and DUP’s messaging was the
beginning of the development of ‘tribune parties’ in Northern Ireland (Mitchell et al,
2009). Rather than increasing attitudinal polarization in Northern Ireland, there is
evidence of increasing attitudinal convergence amongst voters, particularly within each
community, ruling out ethnic outbidding as a credible party strategy (Mitchell et al, 2009:
399). Instead, whilst the 2003 election demonstrated increased voter attitudinal
convergence, it also saw enhanced support for the traditionally extremist parties. The
emergence of ethnic tribune political parties helps to explain why moderate voters may
prefer extreme parties in consociational systems of government (Mitchell el al, 2009:
402). This voter behavior occurred due to ‘compensational voting’, where moderates vote
for those with stronger or more extreme policies, knowing that in consensual systems of
government the process of bargaining and negotiating will lead the policies of ‘extreme’
parties to be watered-down (Mitchell et al, 2009: 402). Consequently, voters vote for the
‘strongest voice’ to represent them in this process.
By 2004 Tilley finds that ‘ethno-national strategy is dominant and left-right
divisions play no significant role in conditioning party support within the Protestant
84

electorate’ (Tilley et al, 2008: 712). The effectiveness of Sinn Fein’s defense of
nationalism was demonstrated by a survey that found that of those surveyed, selfidentified supporters of every party named Sinn Fein as the most effective party in
representing their supporters interests (Mitchell et al, 2009: 411). For Sinn Fein, the focus
on delivery and the protection of nationalist interests was successful and Sinn Fein was
no longer perceived merely as a republican party but the ‘communal standard bearer’.
This enabled Sinn Fein to attract new supporters from within the nationalist community
in addition to mobilizing its traditional base. For the DUP, the aim was to protect
unionism from Sinn Fein ascendancy.
The level of cross-communal transfers in the 2003 Assembly election was low. As
such, the 2003 election served as a rebuke to those who thought the sectarian divide could
be eased. The number of transfers within the unionist and nationalist blocs hardened
(Tonge, 2006: 175). In 1998, there had been a 5 per cent increase in unionist transfers to
the SDLP, with a similar increase in SDLP transfers to pro-peace UUP candidates (Kelly
and Doyle, 2000). However, due to the failure of the first term of office of the Assembly,
cross-community transfers were less frequent in 2003 and preferential voting provided
few incentives for cross-community voting (Tonge, 2006:175).
Instead, voters continued to predominantly remain loyal within their bloc. In West
Belfast, Gerry Adams received the largest number of first preference votes and was
elected. Of his redistributed votes, 82.7 per cent then went to Sinn Fein running mates.
However, the preferential nature of the ballot enabled 13.5 per cent of his transfers to go
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to the SDLP, 0.3 per cent to the UUP and smaller percentages yet to other minor parties.
No votes went to the DUP.
In the rest of the West Belfast race, four other Sinn Fein members were elected,
and one SDLP candidate. The only unionist representative elected was Diane Dodds.
Having received 2544 first preference votes, Dodds received 1513.24 votes when Chris
McGimpsey and High Smyth of the UUP and PUP were eliminated. This vast number of
transfers enabled Dodd to be elected and is evidence of bandwagoning as other unionist
voters corralled behind the ‘most likely’ unionist winner having given their first
preferences to their own party initially. Ultimately Dodds beat the final Sinn Fein
candidate by just 87 votes, the closest inter-party race of the whole election. Dodds was
the first unionist elected to a regional assembly from West Belfast in 20 years.
In 2007, the loss of Dodds’ seat was the only seat DUP lost in the election. This
occurred despite a big increase in the DUP first preference vote to 3661. In this election,
Dodds received few transfer votes, given that there was no PUP candidate and only one
UUP candidate. Consequently, after all transfer votes were taken into account Dodds had
4166 votes in seventh place, 481 short of sixth place. Overall, this performance suggested
low unionist turnout was instrumental in failing to allow Dodds to benefit from transfer
votes. In contrast, Sinn Fein was also extremely successful in balancing their votes across
their candidates.
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In other instances, transfers had a more limited impact. In Upper Bann, where two
DUP, two UUP candidates, a SDLP candidate and a Sinn Fein candidate were elected,
John O’Dowd (Sinn Fein) gained few transfers yet managed to be elected in the final
round. The manner in which O’Dowd edged out incumbent Sinn Fein representative
Dara O’Hagan for the constituency Dara O’Hagan highlighted the power STV gives
voters to choose individual candidates within the same party.

Table 5: Performance of Small Parties (2003)

Party

Number of
First
Preference
Votes

Percentage
of First
Preference
Vote

Alliance

25372

3.70%

Percentage
Change of
First
Preference
Vote
-0.00028

PUP
Kieran Deeny
(West Tyrone)
NIWC

8032

1.20%

-1.40%

6158

0.90%

5785

0.80%

-0.80%

UKUP

4794

0.70%

-3.80%

87

Number
of Seats

Change
in Seats

6

+/- 0

1

-1

1
-2
1

-4

Figure 11: Small Party Percentage of the Total Vote (2003)
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Figure 12: Small Party Percentage Share of Seats (2003)
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Cross-Ethnic Coalition Building
In 2003, candidates from smaller parties were decimated, as highlighted by Table 5.
The NIWC, the United Unionist Coalition and the Northern Ireland Unionist Party lost
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most of their support, whilst the Progressive Unionist Party and UK Unionist Party won
just one seat each. The Alliance Party saw its vote half, though it retained its six seats.
The poor results reflected the marginalization of smaller parties from continued talks
since 1998. By focusing on the larger parties continuing talks to resolve the stop-start
nature of the Assembly served to delegitimize the voices of those from smaller parties,
despite preferential voting aiding their representation in 1998.

•

Alliance

In 2003 Alliance owed its seat retention to the transfers it received. This was
demonstrated by the fact it received 3.7 per cent of the overall first preference vote, but a
considerable 5.6 per cent of the seats. Alliance’s performance seemed poor given that in a
2002 Life and Times Survey, 35 per cent of the population had stated that they did not
identity with nationalism or unionism, showing that there was considerable potential for
Alliance’s growth (Life and Times Survey, 2002). However, the consociational
constitutional framework may have limited Alliance’s performance through the desire of
voters to support a ‘tribune’ party who can stand up for community interests. Dominant
discourse within the political process was on the inclusion of ‘both’ communities, largely
ignoring those who identified outside of unionism and nationalism.28 Alliance may also
have been damaged their reputation given that in 2001 three Alliance members redesignated themselves within the Assembly, dropping their categorization as ‘other’ and
re-categorizing as ‘unionist’ in order to secure the re-election of David Trimble, the UUP

28

One example would be a shift to positive discrimination within Northern Irish society. The PSNI implemented a 50/50 recruitment
quota into the police for ‘both’ communities (Catholics and Protestants), but no reference was made to those who didn’t identify with
either community.
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leader, as First Minister, a move that enabled the UUP to return to the power-sharing
government.29
Alliance won six seats, on average winning each seat after the tenth count in each
ballot, highlighting their dependence on transfer votes. Two of its successes occurred
after Alliance initially came seventh in the first preference votes, highlighting its
dependence on transfer votes. This is further supported by evidence that four of
Alliance’s winning candidates won after being lower in first preference votes than rivals
who were not elected (SDLP two, Sinn Fein and UUP) (Tonge, 2006: 186).
In Strangford, Kieran McCarthy of Alliance, won by 291 votes, attracting
transfers from across the political spectrum despite a strong challenge from Joe Boyle
(SDLP). This represented a clear case of STV enabling voters to reward a more centrist
candidate. McCarthy gained similar levels of transfer votes from the Conservative
candidate, independents, UKUP supporters and Sinn Fein, before gaining the largest pool
of transfer votes following the elimination of the Green Party candidate. The willingness
of Sinn Fein and the Greens to support Alliance here is unsurprising, apart from
McCarthy, the other five successful candidates were all unionists.
A similar effect was demonstrated in South Antrim, where four unionist candidates,
one SDLP candidate and Alliance’s David Ford were elected. Unionist voters seeing a
threat from the Sinn Fein candidate used their transfers to ensure Ford’s victory.
Ultimately, Ford won by just 180 votes. Thus, the Alliance Party largely remains a buffer

29

Some media, such as the Guardian, took a more positive view, ‘Alliance saves Stormont from collapse’ (Hunter, 2001).
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between the two communities. This is supported by the finding that cross-community
voting increases when there is no Alliance Party candidate present (Tonge, 2006).

•

Other Parties

Although the Alliance Party managed to retain its six seats despite their first
preference vote halving, all the other small parties suffered. The NIWC and other smaller
unionist parties saw their support fall dramatically, whilst the PUP and UKUP won just
one seat each. The NIWC lost the two seats they had held since 1998. Although in 1998
when they won 13,018 votes (1.6% per cent of the vote), in 2003 the party secured 3,301
votes (0.4 per cent). Monica McWilliams in South Belfast lost her seat by only 127 votes
to Alasdair McDonnell of the SDLP, perhaps suggesting a slight preference of the
constituency towards the bigger parties and not the smaller ones. In North Down, Morrice
polled only 1,181 votes, the tenth largest number of first preference votes in North Down.
Few voters used their lower order transfer preferences to support her and she failed to be
elected.
The PUP and UK Unionist Party each won one seat. For the PUP, David Urvine
won in East Belfast. The PUP’s message was clear. Its manifesto entitled, ‘How long are
you prepared to wait for benefits for our community?’ was a further attack on the
perceived abandonment of the loyalist working-class, and sought to address the ‘gross
misrepresentation and under-representation of the loyalist working–class’ (PUP, 2003).
Finishing fourth initially in first preference votes, with 2990, he gained 4.6 per cent of
votes from Peter Robinson (DUP), 8.3 per cent of the transfers from Reg Empey (UUP)
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and with that secured enough to be elected following the redistribution of votes from a
number of smaller candidates. Thus, Urvine’s progressive and moderate appeal
encouraged support through transfers. Overall though, the PUP vote had halved since
1998. Ultimately, in East Belfast two DUP, two UUP, and an Alliance candidate were
elected highlighting East Belfast’s position as a unionist stronghold.
For the UK Unionist Party, Robert McCartney continued a second term in office
in North Down. North Down’s role as a unionist stronghold aided his performance
clearly, with the final slate of winners including two DUP candidates, two UUP
candidates and an Alliance candidate in addition to McCartney. The constituency
dynamics were very similar to the neighboring constituency of East Belfast. McCartney
finished fourth on first preferences, with 3374 votes. The election was close, going to 13
counts with four of the eventual winners only being declared winners on the 13th count.
The weak performance of the PUP and UKUP was unsurprising given the failure
of the UUP to deliver the promised peace dividends to the unionist community. Amidst
the context of a weak UUP performance, the PUP and UKUP candidates were seen as
increasingly peripheral to the political process. Their positions were weakened further
due to the lack of engagement they received from the DUP and UUP. Further, the PUP
and UKUP were ignored from key talks aimed at restarting the peace process in 2001 at
Weston Park in England following the resignation of UUP leader David Trimble as First
Minister (BBC, 2001). The stop-start nature of the Assembly meant that there was little
record in office for parties such as the NIWC to run on. This in conjunction with the
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focus of continuing talks on the larger parties meant that there was little incentive to vote
for the smaller parties, particularly given it was more rewarding to be one of the two
named communities in the Assembly, putting pressure on those politicians and parties
aiming to be multi-ethnic or non-ethnic.
The NIWC’s campaign was also out of touch with the nature of a post-conflict
society. Its 2003 manifesto entitled ‘Changing the face of Politics’ included calls for
further positive discrimination towards women across society rather than taking on some
of the most contentious challenges stemming from the peace process (NIWC, 2003).

•

Kieran Deeny (Independent)

One of the biggest talking points of the 2003 election was the winning candidacy
of independent candidate Dr Kieran Deeny, a doctor who campaigned on the single issue
of keeping intact hospital provision in Omagh. In West Tyrone, Deeny finished in first
place in first preferences, with 6158, exceeding the election threshold of 5962.
Prior to the election, the media forecast that one of the two SDLP seats was
vulnerable to Sinn Fein but the seat instead went to Deeny. Deeny argued that his election
was “a significant message from West Tyrone that people demand things other than green
and orange politics" (BBC, 2001). Once Deeny’s surplus votes were redistributed, 47.2
per cent transferred to two SDLP candidates and 29.4 per cent went to Sinn Fein
candidates (ARK, 2003) highlighting Deeny’s dependence on voters who had a clear
preference for nationalist candidates. Of the other candidates, those who lived in Omagh
also benefited given the salience of the hospital issue.
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Summary Analysis
The 2003 election witnessed the beginning of the development of ‘tribune
parties’. With plummeting support amongst the unionist community for the peace
agreement, the DUP positioned itself as the defender of unionism, shifting its position on
the political ground to appeal to new unionist voters whilst continuing to mobilize its
base. Thus, for the 2003 election it made a subtle policy shift moving beyond the
rejection of the 1998 Belfast Agreement and instead calling for its renegotiation. Despite
this moderation, the move represented a form of ethnic outbidding, particularly given the
dominance of claims that the UUP had been weak in protecting the interests of unionism.
This strategic move sought to gain transfer votes from traditional supporters of other
unionist parties such as the UUP, UKUP and PUP who wanted a much stronger assertion
of unionist interests.
Sinn Fein continued to play a central role in delivering the peace process. It used
its campaign to outline a comprehensive agenda for government, promoting itself as the
party best able to deliver for nationalists. This strategic positioning enabled it to mobilize
its base but also appeal to SDLP supporters who wanted nationalist interests to be
protected and who saw the SDLP’s move to ‘post-nationalism’ as premature.
Rather than a party strategy of moderation to occupy the center ground, as seen in
some majoritarian electoral systems, Sinn Fein’s strategy was nuanced, positioning itself
as a defender of nationalism. While its policy positions were more moderate than preAgreement, it remained more nationalist than SDLP. In contrast, the SDLP advocated a
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form of post-nationalism focused on public good delivery rather than constitutional
issues. The SDLP’s attempt to move beyond nationalism saw it lose six seats in the
Assembly.
Amidst this context, smaller unionist parties saw their representation fall
significantly, with unionist interests instead being aggregated by the DUP. Consequently,
smaller unionist parties, such as UKUP, PUP and the independent unionist candidates lost
eight of the ten seats they had won in 1998. Multi-ethnic and non-ethnic parties failed to
benefit in the election. Although the success of independent Kieran Deeney entirely on
first preference votes showed that STV was capable of delivering success for
independents in the right circumstance, Alliance’s failure to add any seats and the loss of
both of NIWC’s seats showed that there was no evidence of centrist, or aggregative
parties coming to the fore.
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2007 election
Preceding Context
Between 2003 and 2007 the Assembly failed to meet due to a negotiations
impasse. The 2003 elections began the process of cementing the dominance of the DUP
and Sinn Fein as the largest parties within each community. Thus the basis for the
formation of the Executive would need to be an agreement between the DUP and Sinn
Fein, yet a willingness by the DUP to contemplate power-sharing meant that there was
little progress towards a power-sharing government. However, the Northern Bank
robbery in 200530 and Robert McCartney’s murder the same year31 removed any prospect
of a deal to form a government. For the DUP, their position remained that power-sharing
was ‘out of the question’ (DUP, 2005).
After talks at St Andrews, Scotland in October 2006 focused on power-sharing
and policing, a timetable was agreed for the restoration of power-sharing. In January
2007, Sinn Fein announced that it would support the Police Service of Northern Ireland
following the approval of more than 90 per cent of party delegates at a special conference
(BBC, 2007).
In the event, the election saw a new focus on ‘bread and butter’ issues that hadn’t
been seen in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. This shifted the focus away from the

30

The Northern Bank robbery was the robbery of 26.5m GBP (44.5m USD) of pounds, euros, and dollars from the Northern Bank
Headquarters in Belfast. The PSNI, British and Irish Governments all hold the PIRA responsible, with the money seen as a “pension
fund’ for former PIRA paramilitaries.
31

The murder was believed to have been carried out by members of the IRA and Sinn Fein, who then used their paramilitary muscle to
intimidate witnesses. The campaign of the McCartney family led to international support and was publicly backed by President
George W. Bush when the family visited the White House.
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dominance of deeper questions on communal politics or constitutional questions. Instead,
water rates, corporation tax, health, education, and the cost of housing played a large part
in the campaign (McEvoy, 2007: 369). Whilst much of the media dubbed the election
‘lacklustre’, most saw it as a return to normalcy. The Irish Times declared the election
‘boring’ as firebrand DUP leader, Ian Paisley, famous for his slogan of ‘no surrender’
was ‘reduced to cheery photo opportunities with old ladies and funny props’ (Irish Times,
2007).
The DUP’s election manifesto, ‘Getting It Right’, in which it outlined the
conditions under which it would share power with Sinn Fein, highlighted the evolution of
DUP’s approach to post-conflict politics (DUP, 2007). The UUP itself directly used the
language of normalcy declaring in its election manifesto that it was now time for ‘normal
politics’ (UUP, 2007).
Thus, the 2007 election was the first where all of the five biggest political parties
broadly supported the Belfast Agreement and consequent peace process, and saw the
DUP and Sinn moderate their policies further.
The DUP adopted explicit messaging designed to stop unionists from voting for
anyone other than the DUP. Ian Paisley, and other senior DUP figures, warned unionists
that votes for unionist parties other than the DUP would risk allowing Sinn Fein’s Martin
McGuinness to become First Minister, a prospect that was unthinkable for many
unionists (Moriarty, 2007). More subtly, the party’s election manifesto noted that the
DUP was the only unionist party ‘realistically capable of winning more seats than Sinn
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Fein to stop them being nominated for the post of First Minister’ (DUP, 2007). Such
messaging would be repeated at the 2011 election.

Election Results
Table 6: 2007 Election Results

Party
DUP
SF
SDLP
UUP
Alliance
Green
Party
UKUP
Republican
Sinn Fein
PUP
Kieran
Deeny
(West
Tyrone)

Number Percentage
Percentage
of First
of First
Change in
Preference Preference
Vote
Votes
Votes
207,721
30.1%
+4.4%
180,573
26.2%
+2.7%
105,164
15.2%
-1.7%
103,145
14.9%
-7.7%
36,139
5.2%
+1.6%

Number
of Seats

Change in
Seats
since 2003

36 seats
28 seats
16 seats
18 seats
7 seats

+6
+4
-2
-9
+1

1 seat

+1

11,985

1.7%

+1.3%

10,452

1.5%

+0.7%

3,880

0.6%

3,822

0.6%

-0.6%

1 seat

+/-0

3,776

0.5%

-0.3%

1 seat

+/-0

-1

The 2007 election saw the DUP and Sinn Fein further increase their support and
was an endorsement of the St Andrews Agreement’s restoration of devolved government
as illustrated in Table 6. The DUP won 36 votes and Sinn Fein 28, making the election
‘hugely successful’ for them (McEvoy, 2007: 373). The results gave Sinn Fein the right
to the post of Deputy First Minister and three executive seats. The Alliance Party gained
an extra seat and increased their share of the vote.
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Figure 13: Percentage of First Preference Votes
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Figure 14: Percentage Share of Seats
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The SDLP and UUP suffered further and for the UUP it was their worst electoral
performance ever. The UUP lost nine seats, one-third of the number of seats they had in
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the Assembly. In East Belfast, a unionist stronghold, the UUP lost 11 per cent of the vote
and UUP party leader Sir Reg Empey was returned with just 14 per cent of the vote on
the third count, a vast reduction in performance compared to the 23 per cent he received
in the same seat in 2003. UUP woes were compounded by the performance of Arlene
Foster for the DUP. Foster had defected from the UUP and switched to DUP. As a result,
her first preference count increased by 2000 votes simply by changing party, indicative of
the impact of ‘tribune parties’ and the role of the DUP within unionism. The UK Unionist
Party lost its representation in the Assembly. Overall, unionist parties were collectively
down 4 seats, nationalist parties were collectively up 2 seats, and ‘others’ were up 2 seats.
Under considerable pressure from the British and Irish governments, the DUP and
Sinn Fein agreed to a power-sharing government to begin in May 2007, resulting in
remarkable images of Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams sitting side by side in the Stormont
Parliamentary Building. Whilst the process of splitting up ministerial portfolios in 1998
took 18 months, this time it was agreed quickly. Using the d’Hondt formula, the
Executive was comprised of four DUP members, three Sinn Fein members, two UUP
members and 1 SDLP member, in addition to giving it a DUP First Minister and a Sinn
Fein Deputy First Minister. Consequently, there was a 7:5 unionist-nationalist split within
the Executive and therefore a grand coalition government. In total DUP/UUP filled 54
assembly seats, and Sinn Fein/SDLP 44.

100

Conciliation
2007 marked the continuation of an emphasis on moderation by Sinn Fein and the
DUP. Sinn Fein made further ‘radical’ moves into the ideological space occupied by the
SDLP. Sinn Fein encroached on the position of the ‘moderate’ SDLP by facilitating the
decommissioning of IRA weapons in 2005 and also accepted the legitimacy of the PSNI
in January 2007 for the first time since the Agreement. Sinn Fein critic, Ruairi
O’Bradaigh, the President of Republican Sinn Fein, argued that by the 2007 Assembly
election Sinn Fein was ‘rapidly becoming indistinguishable from the SDLP’ (McGarry
and O’Leary, 2009: 55–56). This moderation however was largely a continuance of
gradual Sinn Fein behavior since 1994.
Having held total opposition to power-sharing in 1998 and 2003, the DUP now
supported power-sharing in the aftermath of the St Andrews Agreement, something that
fundamentally affected the dynamics of political competition. Since 2004, the DUP had
demonstrated a new willingness to engage with the Assembly, in part due to the fact it
was able to see the opportunities that came with its support for power-sharing, in
particular that it would likely fill the position as First Minister. Therefore, its role came to
be a combination of at times a confrontational attitude towards republicans and a defense
of the unionist community through full participation in the Assembly.
As a result, both of the historically extreme political parties now supported powersharing. Due to the level of moderation during the 2007 election, unionist and nationalist
intra-bloc disagreement was so minimal that the media complained that the election was a
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‘humdrum’ affair and lacked ‘oomph’ This was because ‘the extremes had moved to the
centre ground, leaving it a very crowded place for the old moderates, the SDLP and the
Ulster Unionists’ (McGarry and O’Leary 2009: 56). As a result of this ideological
squeezing, there was a new emphasis on issues affecting everyday life, rather than the
dominance of constitutional questions like in the previous two elections. McEvoy
summarizes the tone of the election:
An interesting aspect of the election campaign was the greater discussion of more
normal ‘bread and butter’ issues rather than communal positions on the Good
Friday/ Belfast Agreement or Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Throughout
the campaign the parties focused on policy issues such as water rates, corporation
tax, health, education and the cost of housing. The media repeatedly reported that
the electorate was concerned first and foremost with the prospect of water
charges, which became the number one issue on the doorsteps. The focus on such
issues led commentators to pronounce that the campaign was low-key. For
instance, the election was described as ‘one of the oddest and strangest elections
in the history of Northern Ireland’ and ‘a sense of political quiet’ had taken hold.
(McEvoy, 2007: 369).
Furthermore, a 2007 survey found that there was little perceived difference in the
desired policies of SDLP and Sinn Fein voters. Instead, it was the constitutional question
that continued to shape the vote choice of potential nationalist voters. SDLP voters were
much more likely than Sinn Fein to state that they were ‘Northern Irish’, whilst Sinn Fein
voters were much more likely than SDLP voters to indicate that they were ‘Irish’.
Similarly, Sinn Fein voters were more likely than SDLP voters to indicate that they were
nationalist and SDLP voters were more likely to be in favor of devolution than
unification with Ireland (Garry, 2007: 465)
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On the unionist side, the survey found that there was no statistically significant
difference between DUP and UUP voters on any of the political cleavage measures.
Instead, UUP and DUP voters were equally likely to prefer devolution rather than direct
rule and equally likely to indicate a British rather than Northern Irish national identity
(Garry, 2007: 463). As a result, Garry argues that ‘the DUP has encroached so far onto
the UUP’s position that the ethno-national conflict cleavage has effectively disappeared
as a driver of vote choice between the parties’ (Garry, 2007: 464). Given this, the
emergence of ‘bread and butter’ issues in the campaign was unsurprising, particularly on
the unionist side where a focus on ‘effective delivery’ is perhaps a more significant
explainer of DUP success. Instead there exists a ‘glaring asymmetry’ relating to the very
strongly ethno-national cleavage basis to nationalist party competition and the absence of
an ethno-national cleavage basis to unionist party competition (Garry, 2007: 465).
Given this survey, fears that the implementation of consociational arrangements
in deeply divided societies would increase the salience of the conflict cleavage for party
competition and voting behavior may well be overstated. Given the convergence on the
unionist side, the parties instead focused on issues that affect voters and the effectiveness
of the delivery of promises made. However, despite the findings of this survey, the reality
is likely to be a more nuanced picture than the survey presents. Northern Ireland’s
opinion polls have historically over-stated the level of pluralistic opinion, and the use of
coded and at times explicit ethnic messaging by the parties suggests that the findings of
the survey were optimistic. Instead, in a society seeking to overcome deep divisions,
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rhetoric and symbolism continue to play an important role in campaigns and mobilizing
turnout.
Changes in ideological outlook within the nationalist community were not onedirectional. The SDLP became ‘greener’ and more nationalist ahead of the 2007 election.
In 2005, the SDLP issued a document, ‘A Better Way’, outlining its continued desire for
a united Ireland and urging action by the government of the Republic of Ireland towards a
united Ireland (SDLP, 2005). This included calls for a roadmap to unity, including the
holding of a referendum. The document was notable for its statement that once a majority
in Northern Ireland supported a united Ireland, then a unified Irish state should be formed
irrespective of continuing opposition from a minority (Tonge, 2006: 202).
In 2007, following the decision that MI5 would take over counter-intelligence
matters from the PSNI as part of a further normalization of security policy in Northern
Ireland, the SDLP made a number of publically critical remarks. In the Assembly, the
SDLP even asked for senior MI5 figures working in Northern Ireland to be named. Such
concerns came at the same time that Sinn Fein had accepted the role of PSNI in Northern
Irish society and was an effort by SDLP to reaffirm its republicanism. With these
developments, the SDLP was clearly engaging in more nationalist messaging for the
2007 election.
Overall, there was little evidence of transfers between DUP and Sinn Fein
supporters with only 0.1 per cent of DUP surpluses transferring to Sinn Fein and vice
versa. There continued to be little reason for the two parties to seek to appeal outside of
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their community for votes, given the negative repercussions this would have in
mobilizing their base. Despite this, there were infrequent demonstrations of outreach
across the divide by the two parties. Rather than a genuine appeal to voters in the other
community, these moves were predominantly intended to appeal to the more liberalminded voters within each party’s bloc.
The 2007 election demonstrated further evidence of ‘institutional learning’, with
Sinn Fein in particular being praised for its ‘successful and sophisticated vote
management’ (McEvoy, 2007:35). In West Belfast the party balanced five candidates,
resulting in all five being elected. This was achieved by Sinn Fein President Gerry
Adams’ personal vote being managed down to just over 6,000 first preferences. This
allowed the four other candidates to come in just under the quota on the first count, whilst
in bloc nationalist transfers then enabled each of them to be elected. As a result, Sinn
Fein was the first party to have five candidates elected in the same constituency. The final
seat in the constituency was won by the SDLP. Sinn Fein’s success occurred even though
the DUP increased the size of their vote in the constituency (McEvoy, 2007: 375).
DUP incumbent Diane Dodds failed to be reelected. Although Dodds had more
than 625 first preference votes than the SDLP winner, Alex Atwood, Dodds lost out by
her failure to attract as many transfers. Therefore this constituency served to demonstrate
that when managed effectively by party political elites, STV rather than encouraging the
moderation of candidates within a constituency could facilitate a more exclusive rather
than inclusive result (BBC, 2007).
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In contrast, the SDLP demonstrated its weak party management in the
constituency of West Tyrone. The SDLP ran three candidates, who together received
enough first preferences to exceed the electoral quota. However, none of the candidates
were able to attract sufficient transfers to be elected. In contrast, Kieran Deeny received
transfer votes across the political spectrum and retained his seat.
Multi-ethnic coalition building
Table 7: Performance of Small Parties (2007)

Party
Alliance
Green Party
UKUP
Republican Sinn
Fein
PUP
Kieran Deeny
(West Tyrone)

Number of
First
Preference
Votes
36,139
11,985
10,452

Percentage
of First
Percentage
Preference
Change
Vote
5.20%
1.60%
1.70%
1.30%
1.50%
0.70%

Number
of Seats

Chang
e in
Seats

7 seats
1 seat

1
1
-1

3,880

0.60%

3,822

0.60%

-0.60%

1 seat

+/-0

3,776

0.50%

-0.30%

1 seat

+/-0
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Figure 15: Small Party First Preference Vote
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Figure 16: Small Party Percentage of Seats
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•

UKUP

The 2007 election saw a number of ‘dissident’ candidates run because of their
opposition to the evolved policies of the DUP and Sinn Fein (McEvoy, 2007: 371).
Challengers included Robert McCartney of the UKUP who ran in six constituencies on a
unionist ‘anti-Agreement’ platform seeking to prevent an Executive featuring
republicans. The UKUP’s campaign was subject to DUP messaging, with the DUP
manifesto explicitly noting that ‘votes for independents or fringe Unionist candidates
endanger a Unionist majority on the Executive, regardless of the size of the Unionist
majority in the Assembly’ (DUP, 2007). In the election, UKUP struggled. McCartney
polled badly in all of the constituencies he contested and lost his own Assembly seat. In
total the UKUP managed to attract just over 10,000 votes.

•

Republican Sinn Fein

On the nationalist side, Sinn Fein also faced competition from a range of
independent candidates opposing their willingness to share power, particularly the
‘Republican Sinn Fein’. However the campaign performed poorly. In Mid-Ulster the
Republican Sinn Fein candidate received 437 first preference votes and in North Antrim
Paul McGlinchey, opposed to Sinn Fein’s policy on policing, obtained only 383 first
preference votes. This was in contrast to Sinn Fein’s Daithi McKay who won purely on
first preferences, finishing behind DUP leader Ian Paisley who topped the poll (McEvoy,
2007: 374).
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•

Alliance

Alliance was the only other Assembly Party beyond Sinn Fein and the DUP to
make gains. It gained one additional seat, but in key constituencies its vote was up
significantly. In East Belfast its vote increased by 9.9 per cent and by 6.7 per cent in
South Belfast. The Progressive Unionist Party retained their seat with a new candidate
and party leader, with an increased share of the vote in East Belfast.

•

Kieran Deeny

While in 2003 Deeny was elected on the first count, this time the campaign was
much tougher and Deeny was elected on the seventh count with 3,776 first preference
votes. Deeny campaigned again on a single issue, the impending closure of the local Sion
Mills medical practice. Given the dysfunctional nature of the 2003-7 Assembly, Deeny
never had a chance to impact the closure of services in Omagh. Further, a leaked 2005
letter by Deeny in which he had approached the SDLP with a view to joining the party
may have also harmed his support amongst voters.

•

Green Party

The Green Party won its first Assembly seat ever, increasing its first preference
vote fourfold from 2003. The scale of the increase in the Green vote had been dramatic.
In 1998, the Greens had received just 710 votes, 0.09 per cent of the vote. This time they
won 1.7 per cent of the vote. Transfers were critical to Green Party candidate Brian
Wilson’s victory. Wilson received 2,839 first preference votes and the fifth seat in North
Down. Although Wilson received transfers from across the community, the elimination
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of the only nationalist candidate in the constituency, William Logan (SDLP) resulted in
641.11 of Logan’s transfers going to Wilson, and another 591 of Logan’s transfers going
to Alliance indicating an attempt by nationalists to seek to prevent another unionist being
elected. Logan’s transfers were clearly the most significant for Wilson, the next largest
number he received were 263.33 following the elimination of independent candidate
Brian Rowan.

Summary Analysis
The 2007 election underlined a new wave of moderation by both Sinn Fein and
the DUP, with Sinn Fein accepting the PSNI for the first time and the DUP demonstrating
its willingness to consider power-sharing with Sinn Fein. The DUP’s positioning as the
most effective standard bearer for unionist interests was reflected in the election results. It
received 30.1 per cent of the first preference vote, but 33.3 per cent of Assembly seats,
demonstrating the ‘bump’ it was gaining through transfer votes. Sinn Fein’s strategic
positioning as a communal standard bearer resulted in the SDLP repositioning itself with
a stronger nationalist orientation. The move was premised on an attempt to keep transfers
within the party, but in fact had little impact.
The performance of the smaller parties remained weak and they continued to
operate on the fringes of politics. There was no evidence of the development of centrist or
multi-ethnic candidates. The Alliance Party gained only one seat despite major
developments in the peace process. The Green Party, the PUP and Kieran Deeny each
picked up a single seat demonstrating that progressive opinion could be represented, but
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this was reliant on the right constituency circumstances, including a narrow cluster of
geographic support and a permissive strategic context. It was notable, for instance, that
the Green candidate received a considerable pool of transfers following the elimination of
the only nationalist candidate in the constituency. This was indicative of strategic
attempts to deny unionists from gaining a further seat. Ultimately, the success of centrist
parties often came at the expense of other centrist parties, rather than from nationalist or
unionist candidates. This highlights that rather than the development of broad crosscutting centrist parties, instead those parties that did have a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic
orientation remained weak and engaged in competition with each other, separate from the
rest of the political parties.
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2011 Election
Preceding Context
The 2011 election was the first time a devolved government in Northern Ireland
had sought re-election since 2007. The 2007-11 administration was the first unsuspended
administration since the 1998 Agreement and was completed due to the cooperation of
the DUP and Sinn Fein.
Against expectations, Ian Paisley, the firebrand leader of the DUP whose slogan
throughout ‘the Troubles’ had frequently been ‘No surrender’ had become First Minister
and Martin McGuinness, a former senior member of the IRA, Deputy First Minister. The
governing coalition also included the SDLP and UUP. Two years into the term, the
Alliance Party was added to fill the contentious Justice and Policing Portfolio. For most
commentators, the single biggest achievement of the Assembly was that it ‘lasted the
distance’ (BBC, 2011). The sharing of power by Sinn Fein and the DUP however had
been unthinkable during 2005, let alone during the depth of inter-communal hatred
during ‘the Troubles’.
Despite what many feared, the 2007-11 administration was completed and only
saw a sparing use of the minority veto that each community was provided with as part of
the consociational framework. Only 20 such vetoes were used over the four year period,
ten by each community and these vetoes were largely restricted to contentious issues such
as Irish language and education (Conley, 2013: 21). The two communities did not
consistently vote in a monolithic bloc, whilst the DUP and Sinn Fein were able to
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cooperate on non-controversial issues (Conley, 2013: 21). The threshold for a community
veto remained 30 seats, thus delegitimizing the Alliance Party and minor parties within
each community.
The 2011 campaign continued a number of recent trends in Northern Irish
Politics. The focus on ‘bread and butter’ issues continued from the 2007 election. Despite
this the legacies of the conflict retained a role in the election campaign and coded
messages were used to ensure voter turnout. The threat of a potential Sinn Fein politician
as First Minister was a key strategy used by the DUP to encourage preference voting and
turnout on electoral day.
Despite the success of the Assembly in completing its term, the administration
still suffered from governance challenges. In 2008, the DUP and Sinn Fein failed to meet
for 154 days due to disagreement about the devolution of justice and policing powers
from Westminster (Matthews, 2012: 341).32 Public dissatisfaction with the Assembly was
high and the institution was not perceived to have worked well for the population from a
governance perspective. This led to concerns about a low turnout of 56 per cent,
compared to 70 per cent in 1998. Some argued that the low turnout supported those who
argued the Assembly was failing to serve the interests of its citizens, while others argued
low turnout reflected satisfaction with the current nature of politics.
There were other sources of tension prior to the election. In 2010, MLA Declan
O’Loan (SDLP), for instance, advocated a merger between the SDLP and Sinn Fein, to
32

Agreement was eventually reached with the new Executive post of Minister of Justice awarded to the Alliance Party leader David
Ford on 12 April 2010.

113

instead form a single nationalist party.33 O’Loan’s statement prompted anger given that
the SDLP had earlier criticized the proposed fielding of a unionist unity candidate (DUP
and UUP) in the 2010 Westminster election in Fermanagh and South Tyrone as a
sectarian carve-up. The move served to highlight some of the division within the SDLP,
and the depth of the dominance of Sinn Fein as the voice of the nationalist community.
Some sections of Northern Ireland remained angry about the ‘unprecedented
cordial relationship’ between Sinn Fein and the DUP (Matthews, 2012: 342). The UUP
made continued reference to the DUP–Sinn Fein axis as a ‘carve-up’. Traditional
Unionist Voice (TUV) leader Jim Allister who opposed power-sharing also used this to
try to add an electoral mandate to his public profile (Matthews, 2012: 342).
In the run up to the election dissident activity risked further instability. On April
2, 2011, less than four weeks prior to the election, a Catholic police officer, Constable
Ronan Kerr, was murdered by dissident republicans in Omagh as part of a continuing
campaign of terrorism against the security services. All the major political parties
condemned the killing.

33

O’Loan was suspended from the SDLP.
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Election Results
Table 8: 2011 Election Results

Party

DUP
Sinn Fein
SDLP
UUP
Alliance
Party
TUV
Green
Party

Percentage
Percentage
Number
Change in
Share of
of First
First
First
Preference
Preference
Preference
Votes
Vote since
Vote
2007
198,436
30.00%
-0.10%
178,224
26.90%
0.80%
94,286
14.20%
-1.00%
87,531
13.20%
-1.70%

Number
of Seats

Seat
Change
since 2007

38 seats
29 seats
14 seats
16 seats

2
1
-2
-2

50,875

7.70%

2.50%

8 seats

1

16,480

2.50%

0.00%

1 seats

1

6,031

0.90%

-0.80%

1 seats

0

The 2011 election largely replicated the results of the 2007 election and was
regarded as an endorsement of the previous administration’s power-sharing government.
With this election, the DUP had achieved twice the vote of the UUP in two successive
elections. Overall changes in representation were minimal, as illustrated in Table 8. The
DUP gained two seats, Sinn Fein one, whilst the UUP and SDLP each lost two seats from
a body of 108 seats. The election served to cement the dominance of the DUP and Sinn
Fein in politics. As the largest party, the DUP took the seat of First Minister, alleviating
fears that had been played up by unionists during the campaign that a unionist might have
to serve under a Sinn Fein First Minister.
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Figure 17: Percentage Share of First Preference Vote
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Figure 18: Percentage Share of Assembly Seats
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Religion and constitutional preference remained a strong predicator of vote choice
in the election. Very few Catholics (3.4 per cent) gave first preference votes to the DUP
or UUP, as can be seen in Table 9. Similarly, few Protestants gave first preference votes
to Sinn Fein or SDLP (0.3 per cent). Critical for explaining voter choice within each
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community remains its constitutional preference. Catholics who prefer a united Ireland in
the long term vote for Sinn Fein rather than the SDLP. Protestants who prefer direct rule
from London in the long term rather than the continuance of devolution vote for the DUP
rather than the UUP. Thus, elections in Northern Ireland largely continue to comprise two
different elections, one within each community.
Table 9: Religion and Voting
(Source: Garry, 2011)
Sinn
Fein

SDLP

Alliance

UUP

DUP

TUV

Other

Total

Protestant

0.0

0.3

11.8

27.4

51.8

3.6

5.2

100

Catholic

57.7

31.3

6.1

0.6

2.6

0.0

1.6

100

The election saw the Alliance Party gain one further seat, taking its total to eight.
It received the largest increase in the percentage of the vote, 2.5 per cent. Thus, ethnic
parties continued to dominate the political spectrum, despite the new prominence and
importance the Alliance Party gained by being given the contentious Justice and Policing
Ministerial Portfolio. After the 2011 election there was the quickest turnaround in the
formation of a new Executive, and the new Executive was announced within a week.
Conciliation
Despite the seeming greater focus on ‘bread and butter’ issues, the election results
were very similar to 2007. Due to the ethnic nature of political parties, little attempt was
made to appeal to those across the divide. Given the nature of the power-sharing
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government, having an effective voice to represent the interests of your community
seemed to remain a key factor in determining vote choice with voters continuing to see it
as rational to support ‘hardline’ parties, given the perception that they were ‘more robust
defenders of their respective communities’ (Garry, 2011:18). Consociationalism itself
may incentivize voters to vote for the strongest voice for the community. However, in
this case it may have been that more traditional ‘voter bandwagoning’ effects that can
explain the result. Voters, sensing the high probability of a DUP-Sinn Fein dominated
government were more likely to support those candidates than the UUP or SDLP. Sinn
Fein and the DUP are also generally favored as better able to represent voters due to their
organizational capabilities.
Sinn Fein and the DUP continued to pursue a more moderate track politically.
This was facilitated by the fact that they faced little ethnic outbidding. For the DUP, the
threat of losses on its extreme right-flank to the TUV was minimal. Consequently, senior
politicians such as leader Peter Robinson were able to moderate the DUP’s message. At
the DUP Party Conference in 2010 Robinson advocated the construction of ‘a shared
society’ and called for the abandoning of DUP’s long-held zero-sum attitude towards its
constitutional rivals (BBC, 2010). Such language has accompanied talk by senior DUP
figures of the need to move Northern Ireland forward and the DUP’s rhetoric with regard
to integrated education has become much more progressive. This progressive rhetoric
was interpreted by many as representing the party moving beyond the legacy of Ian
Paisley as part of an attempt to win more lower preference votes from UUP voters.
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At the same time and despite the focus of DUP’s manifesto on the economy, the
DUP continued to use ethnic and sectarian messaging. The ‘unpalatable’ prospect of a
Sinn Fein First Minister was not referenced in party materials, but was used by politicians
as they campaigned to drive turnout, as it had been in 2007, despite this being a remote
possibility. One outgoing DUP Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) explained:
‘We [DUP] haven’t made it a fear factor, but we have made it an issue’ (Matthews, 2007:
344). It would also feature in local electoral literature and appeared implicit in the DUP
slogan on posters across the province: ‘Only One Unionist Party Can Win’.
Similarly, Sinn Fein also engaged in ethnic messaging. Key campaign pledges in
its 2011 manifesto included seeking a referendum on Irish unity, calling for tax and
borrowing powers to be devolved from London to the Assembly and for people in
Northern Ireland to be allowed to vote in Irish presidential elections. The centrality of
this messaging was clearly designed to highlight Sinn Fein’s brand as the promoter of the
nationalism cause after the first term of power-sharing. Despite this messaging, these
campaign pledges were unachievable given the consociational governing structure and
the depth of unionist opposition.
Although Sinn Fein and the DUP have moderated their ideology and are
constructive members of the power-sharing institutions, these parties have still managed
to combine this with a reputation for defending the interests of their respective
communities (Garry, 2011, 19). Broad satisfaction within the nationalist community was
further demonstrated by the strong rejection of the small number of dissident republican
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candidates who ran, opposed to Sinn Fein’s moderation. John O’Dowd’s clear victory, in
a hotbed for dissident republican activity epitomized this.
The SDLP and UUP sought to criticize the weakness of Sinn Fein and the DUP in
an attempt to win back voters. However, given the consociational grand coalition, which
included UUP and SDLP within the Executive, attempts to distance themselves from
Sinn Fein and the DUP failed. Due to this behavior DUP leader and First Minister Peter
Robinson referred to the SDLP and the UUP as ‘the awkward squad at Stormont’
(McDonald, 2011). Further, given this was the first successful term of government since
the 1998 Agreement there was little appetite to change approach given the stability the
government had delivered. The slogan of DUP’s election campaign, ‘Let’s Keep Moving
Northern Ireland Forward’, aptly tapped into this sentiment (DUP, 2011).
Overall, there was very little change in the nature of the appeals used by the
political parties and this was reflected in the election results. The constituency of West
Tyrone would be the only district where there were two changes in party representation.
The election was notable for ‘the continued elusiveness of the ‘floating’ crosscommunity voter’ which meant the fiercest battles for votes remained intra-communal in
nature (Matthews, 2012: 343). As a result, the most intense political competition
continued to take place between two clear factions in each bloc, the ‘progressive partners’
(DUP, Sinn Fein and Alliance) and the ‘internal opposition’ within the government, the
UUP and the SDLP (Matthews, 2007:344).
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Peter Robinson’s reinvention as a ‘peacetime unionist’ meant that the DUP had
moved from being an anti-Belfast Agreement party in 1998, to a party now firmly in the
middle ground of unionism. Once UUP heartlands, such as Lagan Valley, North Down
and Strangford, were now overwhelmingly supporting the DUP’s progressive platforms.
An analysis of the election results finds that 74 per cent of transfers from unionist
parties went to other unionist parties (Barry and Love, 2011). Only 12 per cent of
transfers from unionist candidates went to nationalists (Barry and Love, 2011). Rather
than seeing cross-community votes, instead the DUP was so successful by being able to
attract transfers within unionism, such that it gained a disproportionate 38 of the seats,
from 30 per cent of the vote.
On the nationalist side, 64 per cent of transfers from nationalist parties went to
other nationalist parties (Barry and Love, 2011). Only 6 per cent of nationalist voters
transfers went to unionists, a decrease from 13 per cent in 2007, refuting those who
claimed nationalists might be willing to cross the divide with transfers and support the
pro-power sharing DUP. In fact, the DUP only received 2 per cent of the transfers from
nationalist voters, whilst Sinn Fein received 2 per cent of the transfers of unionist voters
(Barry and Love, 2011). Transfers between the communities remain low, particularly to
the historically extreme parties.
In the Belfast West constituency, Alex Atwood (SDLP) was the only non-Sinn
Fein candidate elected to the Assembly. Whilst, Sinn Fein candidates filled the five other
seats elected in Belfast West, the success of Atwood was dependent upon transfers from
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the Alliance Party, UUP, the Socialist Party and the Worker’s Party to win in an election
that reached the final ninth possible stage. Atwood’s victory is a clear case of supporters
of other political parties engaging in strategic voting through their preference voting by
preferencing a credible, non-Sinn Fein candidate in order to limit Sinn Fein’s electoral
success.
In 2011, there were three DUP terminal transfer situations, in which no other
unionist candidates were available. In these situations, DUP terminal transfers were 58
per cent for the SDLP, 1 per cent for Sinn Fein and 25 per cent of voters did not use
another transfer vote (Mitchell, 2013: 10). This is suggestive of DUP voters crossing the
divide to aid the SDLP in order to deny Sinn Fein from power. One example of this
would be the race in the Foyle constituency.
In the Foyle constituency in the North West of Northern Ireland, there was only
one DUP candidate with a credible chance of winning a seat. This is unsurprising given
that according to the 2001 census, 75.3 per cent of voters in Foyle had a ‘Catholiccommunity background’. DUP supporters used their first preference votes to ensure the
election of one DUP candidate with the DUP's William Hay being comfortably elected on
first preferences alone. With no UUP candidate running, more than 1100 of his 1600 vote
surplus then transferred to the SDLP, ensuring that their third seat was safe, contributing
to the success of three SDLP candidates. This proved a rare case of DUP voters
supporting SDLP candidates, as opposed to the more common practice of UUP voters
supporting SDLP candidates. This case is suggestive of DUP voters engaging in strategic
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voting in order to moderate the representatives of the nationalist community from Foyle.
Here DUP voters used their lower order preferences to aid the election of more moderate
nationalist SDLP candidates, rather than allowing the election of more extreme Sinn Fein
candidates.
The case of Ruth Patterson, an MLA candidate in the constituency of Belfast
West, highlights the intra-party centripetal effect that STV can encourage under some
circumstances. Patterson had gained a reputation for contentious behavior during 10 years
as a DUP local councilor in Belfast, in particular making remarks in 2004 that were
regarded as an incitement to violence against both Catholics and ethnic minority
community members. In the 2011 election, despite receiving a high number of first
preference votes (the fifth highest in the Belfast South constituency), Patterson failed to
attract sufficient transfer votes to be elected as she proved to be regarded as too extreme
for voters outside of her core base. Ultimately she was beaten by fellow DUP candidate
Jimmy Spratt by just 35 votes.
2011 saw further growing success of Sinn Fein and the DUP in managing their
vote at the election, particularly in their core constituencies. Sinn Fein’s performance in
its stronghold of West Belfast was the epitome of its ‘learning’ of the electoral system
since 1998. As a result of its vote management, it returned all five candidates, despite this
being the first election where its President Gerry Adams did not contest a seat in West
Belfast. Similarly, in Lagan Valley the DUP capitalized on Edwin Poots’s huge 20.7 per
cent first preference vote share to bring home four candidates overall. In three other
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constituencies (Lagan Valley, Strangford, East Antrim), the DUP also secured a ‘1-2-3’
finish, something Sinn Fein only achieved in two constituencies (West Belfast, West
Tyrone).
Encouraging multi-ethnic coalition building
Table 10: 2011 Small Party Election Results

Party

Alliance Party
Traditional Unionist Voice
Green Party
People Before Profit Alliance
UK Independence Party
David McClarty
(E Londonderry)
Alan McFarland (N Down)
Alan Chambers (N Down)
Dawn Purvis (E Belfast)
Progressive Unionist Party

Seats

Change in
Seats
since 2007

7.70%
2.50%
0.90%
0.80%
0.60%

Percentage
Change in
First
Preference
Vote since
2007
2.50%
0.00%
-0.80%
0.70%
0.40%

8 seats
1 seats
1 seats
..
..

1
1
0
..
..

0.50%

..

..

1

0.30%
0.30%
0.30%
0.20%

..
..
..
-0.30%

..
..
..
..

..
..
..
-1

Percentage
Share of
First
Preference
Vote
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Figure 19: Small Party Percentage Share of First Preference Vote
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Figure 20: Small Party Percentage Share of Seats
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The Alliance Party gained an extra seat in the 2011 election after continuing to
market itself as a change agent in Stormont. More significant though was a 2.5 per cent
gain of the vote, representing a continued increase since 2003 and 2007. Its return of
125

eight seats was proportional with eight seats equating to 7.4 per cent of the seats in the
Assembly, against Alliance’s actual vote of 7.7 per cent. Alliance campaigned on the
election slogan ‘Leading Change’ and its election manifesto continued to demonstrate its
call for inclusion:
We have been at the forefront of standing up for democracy, human rights and the
rule of law. We have pioneered power-sharing and integrated education, and been the
staunchest and clearest advocates of building a shared future (Alliance, 2011).
Furthermore, its statement, “Rising above the unionist-nationalist divide, we
welcome people from all backgrounds” (Alliance, 2011) suggested the sort of possibility
for a future of Northern Irish Politics not focused on sectarianism. Nonetheless, its
electoral performance only represented a moderate improvement. Despite the emergence
of ‘bread and butter’ issues and a seat on the Executive, a one-seat gain highlights the
nature of the entrenched voting patterns in Northern Ireland, whilst in North Down
candidate Anne Wilson narrowly lost to the Green Party.
The PUP, TUV, Green and one independent each won one seat. Such parties were
very much on the fringe of Northern Irish politics. The TUV, a staunchly anti-powersharing breakaway group won its first seat, with party leader Jim Allister pledging to be a
“thorn in the flesh” of the DUP and Sinn Fein (BBC, 2011). It opposed both the St
Andrews Agreement and DUP power-sharing with Sinn Fein. The fringe nature of its
appeal was demonstrated by its election manifesto which noted that TUV’s key campaign
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promises included ‘Unionism that sticks to its word’, ‘Standing resolutely against the
IRA’s wreckers agenda’ and ‘Refusing to reward terrorism’ (TUV Manifesto, 2011).
The Green Party retained its one seat in North Down, albeit with a new candidate.
Overall North Down saw three DUP candidates, a UUP candidate and an Alliance
candidate also elected, an exact replica of the 2007 results in this constituency. The Green
candidate narrowly edged out a second Alliance candidate by just 99 votes, however
overall the election demonstrated the swell of voters willing to support the centrist
policies in this particular constituency.
Summary Analysis
The 2011 election demonstrated that despite the settling of many of the
constitutional issues with the St Andrews Agreement, the 2007 election, and the
successful first full administration from 2007-11, ethnic voting remained dominant and
there was only limited evidence of inter-ethnic vote-pooling. Despite election rhetoric
focusing on public good provision and the economy, underlying electoral dynamics still
reflected ethnic biases. Thus, accompanying policies on public goods provision was
ethnic messaging.
The DUP, for instance, relied on the inflated prospect of Sinn Fein’s Martin
McGuinness becoming First Minister, as they had in 2007, and which again did not
happen. This strategy however enabled them to mobilize their own supporters and
encourage supporters of other unionist parties to vote for them through first preference or
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lower-vote transfers to support the DUP. Ultimately, the DUP won 35.2 per cent of the
Assembly’s seats with only 30 per cent of first preference votes, suggesting that transfers
helped to inflate its seat total. Sinn Fein also used ethnic messaging. It used the campaign
to promise to hold a referendum on Irish unity, an unachievable aim but something that
sought to rally nationalist voters.
Sixteen years after the election, intra-bloc transfers continued to dominate.
Although, the fact that 12 per cent of transfers from unionist candidates went to
nationalists represents a moderate form of inter-ethnic cooperation, it also highlights the
dominance of intra-bloc transfer patterns (Barry and Love, 2011). Only 6 per cent of
nationalist voters transfers went in the opposition direction and notably there was very
little transfer of votes between the DUP and Sinn Fein, the two most significant parties.
The moderate ethnic parties, the UUP and SDLP, sought to criticize the DUP and
Sinn Fein for perceived ‘weakness’ through power-sharing demonstrating that they had
been forced to move further away from the center to try and reap electoral success.
However, given the inclusiveness and stability that the first power-sharing government
had delivered, such messaging was likely to have little impact.
The Alliance Party gained one seat in the election despite holding the high profile
Justice and Policing Executive Portfolio since 2009. The one seat gain gave it eight seats
in the 108 member Assembly. The TUV, independent David McClartey, and Green Party
were the only other small parties to win a seat in the Assembly. Thus, any improvement
in fortunes for multi-ethnic and non-ethnic parties is likely to only be gradual and four
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election cycles after the Belfast Agreement there remained no evidence of the significant
development of the multi-ethnic centrist parties that might have been expected to emerge.

129

Discussion
In the case of Northern Ireland, this paper has demonstrated that the choice of
electoral system plays an important contribution to inclusion and conciliation. Given
this, the paper makes the following principal findings:
1. STV has aided the moderation of ethnic political parties in Northern Ireland
The evidence above is suggestive that preferential incentives have encouraged the
narrowing of Northern Ireland’s political spectrum through the moderation of the
previously extreme political parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein.
Whilst one of the key critiques of centripetalism has been the lack of supporting
empirical evidence, this paper provides clear evidence of limited centripetalism through
an examination of the four election cycles since the Agreement.
Through an analysis across electoral cycles this research finds that preferential voting
has not encouraged the development of broad-based multi-ethnic political parties, as
many such as Benjamin Reilly argue (Reilly, 2006). Instead, it has enabled voters to
remain loyal to the political party that they have traditionally supported whilst giving
lower order preferences to other political parties. This has encouraged political parties
such as the DUP and Sinn Fein to engage in political moderation rather than ethnic
outbidding as an electoral strategy in order to win votes from other intra-community
supporters. Such moderation has enabled Sinn Fein to mobilize its base whilst also
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attracting new voters and gleaning lower-order preference votes from voters who support
the SDLP. Sinn Fein’s moderation has been ‘spectacular’ (Tonge, 2006: 176):
Political U-turns since the 1990’s, usually initially denied to the grass roots, have
included the disavowal of violence, entry to Stormont (the Northern Irish
Assembly), removal of the demand for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland
within a specified time frame, tacit acceptance of the principle of consent for
constitutional change to Northern Ireland, support for power-sharing, acceptance
of the European Union and eventually support for the Police Service of Northern
Ireland (Tonge, 2006: 176).
The moderation of political parties was not only intended to pick up the first
preference votes of voters but also their lower order transfer votes. The incentives
provided by preferential voting reduced the divisiveness and exclusionary modes of
unionism, instead consolidating unionist voices into a more unifying and inclusive DUP.
Limited moderation by the DUP and Sinn Fein has been critical for conflict management
within Northern Irish society and for consolidating the progress of the peace process,
particularly given the implementation difficulties of the Belfast Agreement in the years
1998 to 2007. Thus, the DUP’s moderation has risked the scope for ethnic outbidding
within unionism. The anti-power-sharing UKUP now has no electoral support, and the
anti-power-sharing TUV hold only one seat.
This research demonstrates that STV can induce moderation through intra-party
and inter-party transfers. Such moderation enabled parties who engaged in
accommodative behavior to receive clear electoral rewards by positioning themselves as
the defender of community interests, thus enabling them to continue to mobilize their
base but also to attract a greater number of lower preference votes from more moderate
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voters. Such strategy represents a ‘nested game’ (Tsebelis, 1990). Although it might seem
‘suboptimal’ for more moderate voters within each ethnic community to reward more
extreme parties through preference votes, such voting is a part of a network of games in
order to determine effective representation for that voter’s community within the wider
consociational framework, whilst often also trying to deny candidates from the other
ethnic bloc from being elected.
Strategic positioning by Sinn Fein and DUP has limited opportunities for electoral
success by multi-ethnic and non-ethnic parties. The most successful multi-ethnic party
has been the Alliance Party. In each of the elections it received the following percentage
of first preference votes:
1998: 6.5%
2003: 3.7%
2007: 5.2%
2011: 7.7%
These performances suggest that there is little indication of growing moderation
within the electorate’s voting behavior. Instead, the moderation of DUP and Sinn Fein
has enabled the parties to pick up lower preferences from within community voters who
already belonged to the more moderate parties in their communities. The Alliance Party’s
struggles are representative of those of other multi and non-ethnic parties. The NIWC
managed to win two seats in 1998 but none subsequently after initially winning two seats,
with the party’s vote halving in 2003 and the non-ethnic Green Party has won one seat in
the last two elections.
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Some authors, particularly Donald Horowitz, have argued that STV is not suited
to a deeply divided society because the incentives for cross-ethnic vote swapping are
insufficient. However, this research finds that in this case this same impact has enabled
intra-bloc moderation providing crucial benefits to Northern Ireland’s peace process and
increasing stability and inclusion within its politics. Nonetheless, in constituencies that
lack sufficient heterogeneity Horowitz’s argument has been demonstrated. Horowitz
critiqued STV given that its low electoral threshold was insufficient to encourage parties
to engage in vote-pooling strategies. This paper has found that in constituencies where
one community represents less than 20 per cent of the population that both unionists and
nationalists have been able to dominate through in-bloc transfers. West Belfast represents
a clear example of this where successful party management means that in the last two
elections Sinn Fein have won five of the six seats.
2. Intra-Community and Inter-Community Vote Pooling
Although preferential voting has encouraged some inter-ethnic voting,
particularly in the 1998 ‘founding’ election, STV’s principal impact has been in
encouraging intra-bloc moderation. Once these effects manifested themselves from the
2003 election onwards and particularly in 2007, it contributed to a significant
stabilization within politics and the Assembly moved beyond its stop-start nature to be an
effective governing body.
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Given the severity of the division between the two communities, there has been
little significant voting across the divide, although there is evidence of some SDLP and
UUP supporters swapping transfers in order to seek to prevent the DUP and Sinn Fein
from winning seats. This has been aided by the development of centrist multi-ethnic/nonethnic parties such as the NIWC and the Alliance Party. Although some argue that the
level of inter-bloc voting should call into question whether STV is the best system
(McEvoy, 2007: 376), this fails to recognize the intra-bloc benefits it has had.
This paper has identified patterns of strategic voting under preferential voting. In
certain circumstances, voters used their preferences in order to deny a candidate
perceived to be unappealing from power. This research has found voter behavior
suggestive of this practice. This evidence suggests that such behavior is particularly
likely to occur in constituencies dominated by an ethnic bloc. Supporters of candidates
from outside the bloc may then engage in strategic voting using their preferences to deny
another candidate from the dominant ethnic bloc being elected.

3. Lessons for Institutional Engineering
Consociationalists are often characterized as prioritizing inclusion rather than
moderation, whilst critics of consociationalism are often regarded as prioritizing
moderation rather than inclusion. However, the case of Northern Ireland should provide
further consideration of the merits of combining modes of consociationalism and
centripetalism in future post-conflict constitutional frameworks.
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The experience of Northern Ireland over the last four election cycles highlights
the complexity of institution building in post-conflict states. In this case, while
consociational institutions such as the Executive have favored inclusion, the electoral
system has promoted centripetalism within each community, helping to moderate the
divergent viewpoints within the Executive. Thus, both inclusion and moderation have
been encouraged, and now all major parties are included in a power-sharing executive.
This case has important ramifications for the wider debate with regard to electoral
systems in deeply divided societies. As noted earlier, Lijphart advocates for the use of
closed party-list systems in post-conflict societies given his belief that this electoral
system will give party leaders more power within their party, aiding the sustenance of
inter-ethnic consociational deals. However, in Northern Ireland, STV did not impact on
the ability of party leaders to control their parties and direct their future direction. In
contrast, Horowitz’s preference for the use of AV is based on a desire to encourage interethnic vote pooling and the emergence of more moderate parties. Yet, as demonstrated
above STV can also encourage moderation and inclusion whilst also having a much
lower electoral threshold than AV enabling the representation of diverse views and
minority parties.
4. Lessons for a divided society
The nature of the division within society has an important impact on the operation
of STV. Northern Ireland’s dyadic divisions have meant that STV has aided the
development of a dominant two party ethnic system, with one large party in each
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community, in addition to a smaller party within each community. The impact of
preferential voting outlined in this paper means that there has been a predominant
unwillingness of voters within each community to cross the sectarian divide, despite
growing attitudinal convergence.
This underlies the need for a careful assessment of prevailing social and political
conditions when choosing a new electoral system. This should include an evaluation of
the potential development of multi-ethnic or non-ethnic parties operating in society.
Similarly, if a society were to have a tripartite division, the mechanics of STV would also
need careful consideration given the potential for strategic cooperation between two of
the three communities, which could affect dynamics of marginalization and exclusion of
others within society.
The case of Northern Ireland disconfirms theoretical notions that STV is likely to
lead to party fragmentation given that voters vote for individuals rather than parties. The
analysis of Northern Ireland’s electoral cycles found little evidence of this, beyond splits
within the UUP in 1998. Instead candidates typically appeal for personal support whilst
also operating as a party team within a constituency. This is because when one candidate
is eliminated from the count or has a surplus of votes distributed, it is important for party
strategy that the redistribution of votes within the party is maximized and that as many as
possible of his or her votes transfer to the party's other candidates, hence benefiting party
cohesion.

136

The performance of smaller parties beyond the two primary ethnic parties within
each community provides important lessons for understanding modes of inclusion and
conciliation within society. Performance in the 108-seat Assembly can be summarized as
follows:
1998 – 15 seats (Alliance 6 seats, UKUP 5, PUP 2, NIWC 2)
2003 – 9 seats (Alliance 6, PUP 1, Kieran Deeny 1, UKUP 1)
2007 – 10 seats (Alliance 7, Green 1, PUP 1, Kieran Deeny 1)
2011 – 10 seats (Alliance 8, TUV 1, Green 1)
With an electoral threshold of 14 per cent, smaller parties have struggled
electorally. Although there was evidence of ethnic bloc fragmentation in the political
sphere in 1998, in subsequent election cycles small parties have struggled to retain their
presence in the Assembly. Voters have continued to predominantly support ethnically
based parties and the performance of Sinn Fein and the DUP have been aided through
‘institutional learning’, as the parties have become increasingly successful in managing
their approach to elections over election cycles.
Since 2003, the performance of the smaller parties has been capped at 10 seats
and has been dominated by Alliance, which has typically won 6 or 7 seats. Despite the
scale of government dysfunction between the years 1998 and 2007 there was little public
appetite to turn to multi-ethnic parties such as Alliance and instead Alliance tends to
predominantly perform well when nationalists are unable to get their own preferred
candidates elected. Although a future move away from consociational governing
structures could aid the development of multi-ethnic parties in the short and medium
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term, a preference for ethnic-based parties is likely to remain. Preferential voting has
aided the growth and maintenance of strong and effective ethnic political parties, and has
aided a move away from bloc fragmentation, but it has been the DUP and Sinn Fein that
has primarily benefited from this effect.
The operation of STV and the extent to which it encourages centripetal activity is
dependent on the level of heterogeneity within a constituency, like many electoral
systems. Parties with a geographically dispersed support have largely failed to benefit
due to the constituency nature of STV compared to a list-system of PR such that parties
with geographically dispersed support, such as the NIWC, have failed to maximize their
representation. In constituencies with a dominant population from one community, STV
can produce electoral results in a manner reminiscent of FPTP. For instance, the
dominance of people in West Belfast who self-identify as having a Catholic-community
background, has been reflected in voting results with five of the six representatives in the
last two cycles being elected from Sinn Fein, particularly aided through intra-bloc
transfers. Five of Northern Ireland’s 18 constituencies lack sufficiently heterogeneity
such that one community represents less than 20 per cent of the total population in each
of the constituencies.
The struggles that small parties have faced electorally has occurred despite the
compromise agreed as part of the Good Friday negotiations. This compromise saw the
number of representatives in each constituency increased from five to six, reducing the
electoral threshold needed to win a seat and also reducing the need to appeal to voters
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from outside of a candidate’s core base. Thus, those parties that have managed to break
the barrier have done so predominantly through geographically narrow and focused
support. It was notable however that in order to win in 2011, the Green Party candidate
narrowly squeezed out an Alliance Party candidate, highlighting the level of intra-centrist
competition.
The extent to which the current electoral threshold will continue remains
uncertain. Both the SDLP and Alliance included provisions in their 2011 election
manifestos advocating for reductions in the number of MLAs amidst grumblings about
the cost of politics. The SDLP called for a cut from six to five MLAs in each
constituency whilst Alliance proposed a deeper cut to the number of MLA’s leaving a
total of 80, rather than the current 108. Amidst this discussion, little focus has been paid
to the negative repercussions that this would have on the issue of inclusion given that the
reduction would lead to elevated electoral thresholds. The focus on the cost of politics
ignores the rational for the initial increase from five to six seats per constituency in 1998
that was to enhance inclusion and the representation of smaller political parties and the
views they represented.
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Conclusion
This study has examined political and voter behavior across Northern Ireland’s
four election cycles since 1998. Northern Ireland is the seminal case study for examining
whether STV encourages ‘vote-pooling’ behavior in a post-conflict society. This study
examined Northern Ireland amidst the puzzle that Northern Ireland has not seen the
development of a system of ‘centrist, aggregative and multi-ethnic political parties’
(Reilly, 2006: 816). There has been limited inter-ethnic cooperation despite what some
supporters of STV expected and centrist, aggregative multi-ethnic political parties have
failed to achieve the electoral success expected. Instead, Northern Ireland’s historically
‘extreme parties’, Sinn Fein and the DUP have benefited at the expense of more moderate
parties within the political system.
Although there is little evidence at large as to how the incentives of electoral
systems take effect, this research posits that the preferential electoral system has
encouraged intra-community moderation, rather than encouraging inter-ethnic
cooperation through the rise of multi-ethnic centrist, aggregative parties. Preferential
voting has provided electoral incentives for Sinn Fein and the DUP to moderate from
their previously extreme positions. In 1998, the DUP was a political party that rejected
the Belfast Agreement. Sinn Fein supported the Agreement but did not support the
civilian police force in Northern Ireland. With these political positions strategies of ethnic
outbidding, each party achieved limited electoral success with the DUP winning the third
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largest number of seats in the 1998 election and Sinn Fein the fourth largest number of
seats.
Over subsequent election cycles, the incentives of preferential voting have
encouraged Sinn Fein and the DUP to moderate in order to maximize their opportunities
for electoral success. In the period 1998 to 2007 there was increasing dissatisfaction
amongst unionists with the Belfast Agreement but little appetite for its rejection.
Consequently, the DUP subtly moderated its messaging. Rather than arguing for rejection
of the Belfast Agreement as it had previously, instead it called for renegotiation in order
to attract the preference votes of disenchanted UUP supporters while also mobilizing the
DUP base. A failure to do so and a continued inability to attract lower order preferences
from within the unionist community would have risked further electoral marginalization.
Amidst the stop-start implementation of the Belfast Agreement, Sinn Fein
positioned itself as the ‘defender’ of the interests of the nationalist community. Thus,
Sinn Fein moderated a number of its policy positions after 1998 culminating in its
acceptance of the PSNI in 2007. Its ‘defender’ role enabled it to mobilize its base whilst
also attracting transfers from SDLP supporters who wanted to ensure that the nationalist
community realized the benefits of the Belfast Agreement and who found Sinn Fein’s
policies more attractive and pragmatic during a process of post-conflict transition than the
SDLP’s attempts, particularly at the 2003 election, to move nationalism to a postnationalist agenda.
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Amidst this, Northern Ireland’s multi-ethnic and non-ethnic parties have failed to
achieve electoral success. The Alliance Party achieved 7.7 per cent of first preference
votes in 2011, its best performance in post-Belfast Agreement Northern Ireland.
Although, preferential voting is expected by some to incentivize voting for multi-ethnic
candidates, there been little support for such candidates. With the exception of a number
of small geographic clusters of moderate opinion, Alliance has predominantly benefited
electorally when voters have engaged in strategic voting in order to deny a candidate
from the other community from electoral success, particularly when such voters are in the
clear minority in that community.
The difficulty of establishing how political elites and voters respond precisely to
electoral incentives is well known. Nonetheless, this paper has demonstrated patterns of
intra-bloc conciliation but limited cross-ethnic campaigning across elections. Although
this research has not been able to demonstrate a systematic pattern of behavior, the
patterns found provide the basis for important future research in this area given the
continuing puzzle of how elites and voters respond to electoral incentives. The findings
of this research suggest that such research could consist of a systematic pattern of
interviews with political elites about the nature of campaign strategizing and coalition
making across the four Assembly elections in post-Belfast Agreement Northern Ireland.
The patterns across cycles demonstrated in this research also suggest that a second
research project focused on running experiments to measure voting behavior would
provide further clarity as to how preferential voting incentives shape voter behavior. This
would be particularly valuable when voters were faced with strategic ethnic voting
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dilemmas of the type documented above. Such research would enable a greater and more
nuanced understanding of the operation of conciliation and cross-ethnic campaigning in
response to the incentives of the electoral system.
Given how rarely STV is used in national level elections, we must be cautious in
understanding its implications and we cannot be sure what STV’s ‘general’ effects are
(Gallagher et al, 2011: 389). However, this paper does provide an important analysis of
the impact of STV in the only divided society in which it is currently used. As Horowitz
himself notes, the role of a political scientist should not be to give ‘off the shelf’
recommendations with regard to electoral systems (Horowitz, 1991: 165). Yet, what is
clear is that electoral systems should not be seen as “mechanistic, abstract and highly
technical” (Norris, 2004: 64) but instead as something that can have a fundamental
impact on conciliation and moderation in a post-conflict society, as in the case of
Northern Ireland.
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